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Radicalization and political violence are traditionally explained as rational, 
instrumental choices motivated by grievances, deprivation, oppression, and other factors 
external to the individual. This explanatory model, however, is dangerously incomplete; 
many radicalized individuals appear to be internally motivated toward violence as a way 
to bring meaning to their lives. Western philosophy, and the existentialist school in 
particular, has long recognized the centrality of meaning to human existence. Psychology 
and sociology have more recently empirically demonstrated meaning-in-life’s close 
connection to happiness, psychological well-being, and even physical health. This thesis 
examines both the philosophy and science of meaning-in-life, demonstrating the process 
through which it is produced and terrorism’s unique ability to do so. Finally, this thesis 
examines four case studies across time, place, and ideological basis to establish the 
influence of existential motives in the history of terrorism. Understanding and accounting 
for the importance of meaning-in-life and its role in terrorism will help develop effective 
counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism programs that account for more 
than rational, instrumental motives. 
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On July 13th 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested the son of a well-
regarded Boston Police Captain for felony possession of firearms, among other charges. 
Twenty-three-year-old Andrew Ciccilo, or as he preferred to be known, Ali Al Amriki, is 
alleged to have planned to attack multiple college campuses with explosive devices and 
firearms in an Islamic State (IS) inspired plot.1 Raised in comfort in an upper-middle-
class family free from state violence and oppression, he exhibited few markers common 
to terrorists and insurgents prior to his arrest. He is but one of an estimated four thousand 
Westerners who have left their lives of relative comfort and safety to take up the cause of 
the Islamic State at home or abroad.2 Five decades earlier, the young men and women in 
Italy’s Red Brigades and Germany’s Red Army Faction, who unleashed a reign of terror 
across Europe, were often educated professionals with privileged upbringings. These are 
but a few of the many conundra for which standard explanations for why individuals 
become terrorists offer few satisfying answers.     
Albert Camus begins The Rebel, his study of the motivation for rebellion and 
revolution, by positing that “there are crimes of passion and crimes of logic.”3 Camus’ 
“crimes of logic” are those acts for which cause and effect can be traced to a political, 
instrumental objective. Indeed, traditional efforts to explain radicalization and the 
decision to employ political violence regard such choices as rational, instrumental, and 
motivated by factors external to individuals. Yet, this model is dangerously incomplete 
and underdetermined. Anomalies like Andrew Ciccilo are found across time and across 
cultures—individuals whose positions in society belie the conventional conceptions of 
radicalization and who appear instead to be internally motivated toward violence.  
                                                 
1 Travis Anderson and Astead W. Herndon, “Father of Adams Man Tipped off FBI on Son’s Terror 
Leanings,” Boston Globe, July 13, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/13/adams-man-
charged-connection-with-alleged-terror-plot/v3fGrcmdc03Bzh0xl8skGL/story.html. 
2 Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (July 21, 2015): 107, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/446. 
3 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, trans. Anthony Bower, 1st Vintage 
International ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 3. 
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Research on radicalization and terrorism today emphasizes logical, causal 
mechanisms—finding political violence’s roots in greed, grievance, relative deprivation, 
nationalism and religious faith, among many other correlations.4 Each individual who 
pursues political violence and terrorism is then assumed to make a rational calculation. 
On the surface, this is compelling and logical. If root causes can be determined, they can 
be mitigated and it makes clear sense to focus upon the external ideological and 
instrumental motivations of terrorists that might be shifted changes in conditions. 
However, the rational, strategic model of terrorist decision making faces a mounting 
challenge to its empirical and explanatory capability.5 Neither the decision making of 
terrorist organizations nor their strategic manifestations appear to always obey what 
might be predicted by the rational model.6 Terrorists are rarely pure utility maximizers 
who carefully examine their available options and make a calculation to pursue and 
action when the expected gains outweigh the costs of their actions.7  
The psychological approach to understanding why individuals become terrorists 
fares no better than the rational choice model in its explanatory power as a discrete 
paradigm. Logically, if external forces cannot explain terrorism, it must find its 
motivation from the mind or an abnormality therein. Despite intensive attempts to locate 
                                                 
4 Among the most cited works in this tradition are Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 
Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1, 1981): 379–99, doi:10.2307/421717; Martha Crenshaw, “Theories 
of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” Journal of Strategic Studies 10, no. 4 
(December 1, 1987): 13–31, doi:10.1080/01402398708437313; James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do 
Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 
(September 1, 2008): 469–88, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x; Randy Borum, “Radicalization into 
Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (January 
1, 2011), doi:10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1. 
5 See Max Abrahms, “Are Terrorists Really Rational? The Palestinian Example,” Orbis 48, no. 3 
(2004): 546, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2004.04.001; Marc Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (September 1, 2014): 565–67, 
doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.895649; Anthony N. Celso, “Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of 
Irrationality,” Orbis 58, no. 2 (2014): 230–32, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2014.02.003. 
6 Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” Public Choice 128, no. 1–
2 (July 21, 2006): 97–98, doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9046-8. 
7 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 
International Security 32, no. 4 (April 1, 2008): 79, doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.78. 
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a pathological and deviant terrorist psychology, these efforts have roundly failed.8 No 
reliable or consistent profile of terrorists exists; rather, the singular consistency between 
terrorists across cultures and time remains their fundamental normality.9 Despite these 
failures and given the equifinality toward terrorism, we know that the turn to violence 
must, in its essence, result from factors internal to the human mind. Though the field of 
terrorism studies has come far since the attacks of September 11th 2001, many gaps 
remain in our knowledge. At the same time, counter-terrorism (CT) programs and 
policies pursued by many governments continue to be constructed upon incomplete 
theories of terrorist motivation rooted in flawed western assumptions of universal values. 
The role of emotions in violence and terrorism is acknowledged by most, yet explored in 
depth by few, but both are inexorably intertwined.10 Instrumental rationality cannot be 
separated from the emotional component of terrorism if we are to get any closer to 
answering the fundamental question: what leads a person to turn to political violence?11  
Perhaps scholars of terrorism and political violence, in their zeal to locate rational 
root causes and deterministic causal mechanisms or psychological profiles, have 
overlooked a key attribute of human behavior understood and explored by philosophers 
for millennia: the existential drive. Few individuals who join terrorist organizations 
initially appear to be motivated by religious narratives or intense belief in a cause.12 
                                                 
8 Laurence Miller, “The Terrorist Mind II. Typologies, Psychopathologies, and Practical Guidelines 
for Investigation,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 50, no. 3 
(June 1, 2006): 261–67, doi:10.1177/0306624X05281406; John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and 
Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (July 1, 2008): 80, 
doi:10.1177/0002716208317539. 
9 John Horgan, “The Search for the Terrorist Personality,” in Terrorists, Victims and Society: 
Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences, ed. Andrew Silke (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2003), 16–18; Andrew Silke, “Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist 
Abnormality in Psychological Research,” Psychology, Crime & Law 4, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 53, 
doi:10.1080/10683169808401747. 
10 Stephen Vertigans, The Sociology of Terrorism: Peoples, Places and Processes (Abingdon, Oxon ; 
New York: Routledge, 2011), 23. 
11 Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” 565. 
12 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004); and Bakker finds those specifically involved in jihadist terrorism from Europe to be living 
normal lives similar to their neighbors , see Edwin Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their 
Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad ; an Exploratory Study, Clingendael 
Security Paper, No. 2 (Den Haag: Clingendael, 2006), 49. 
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Many have never been directly victimized by the enemy they seek to fight.13 Radical 
beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient causes for terrorism, nor is poverty, 
deprivation, or oppression.14 If they were, terrorism would be a far more common 
phenomenon. Even in the deepest examinations, many instances of terrorism appear to 
have no discernable ex ante political motivation, with the cause and justification often 
constructed after the act.15 For these terrorists, their acts are not always instrumental. 
Rather, suffering and self-overcoming achieved through violence and “crimes of 
passion,” are their own reward, unsubordinated to rationality and any political 
consequence of their actions. As it was for Nietzsche’s Übermensch, struggle is both 
means and end.16 
Recognition of the power of the drive for meaning-in-life and passion in 
motivating people to action has a long tradition across a wide range of philosophical and 
sociological schools. Seventeenth century French moralist Jean de La Bruyère found that, 
“nothing is easier for passion than to overcome reason, but the greatest triumph is to 
conquer a man’s own interests.”17 Nothing could be more contrary to an individual’s 
interests in their traditional conception than suicide terrorism, yet it has occurred over 
five thousand times since 1980.18 Three-hundred years after La Bruyère, fellow 
                                                 
13 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of 
Jihad,” International Security 35, no. 3 (December 1, 2010): 57–59, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00023. 
14 James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavages,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 170, 
doi:10.1080/095465590944578; Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of 
Terrorism, Lionel Robbins Lectures (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 2; Crenshaw, “The 
Causes of Terrorism,” 388. 
15 Sarah Colvin, Ulrike Meinhof and West German Terrorism: Language, Violence, and Identity, 
Studies in German Literature, Linguistics, and Culture (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 9; Hans-
Peter van den Broek, “BORROKA—The Legitimation of Street Violence in the Political Discourse of 
Radical Basque Nationalists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (January 1, 2004): 723–24, 
doi:10.1080/095465590885141. 
16 Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic 
Individualism, Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 12. 
17 Quoted in Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 337. 
18 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 (July 1, 2004): 250, doi:10.1080/10576100490466498; Benjamin Acosta, 
“Dying for Survival Why Militant Organizations Continue to Conduct Suicide Attacks,” Journal of Peace 
Research, January 14, 2016, 3, doi:10.1177/0022343315618001. 
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Frenchman Albert Camus offered a similar appraisal, writing that “the rebel does not ask 
for life, but for reasons for living.”19 Here, the tradition of existentialist philosophy in 
which Camus was writing offers an alternative explanation of why otherwise normal 
individuals, living otherwise normal lives might turn to violence and terrorism against all 
logic and reason. In the face of many questions asked, but unanswered, existentialist 
philosophy may offer some answers.  
At its core, existentialist philosophy proposes that all humans face the emptiness 
of essential meaning or purpose in their lives. This so called “angst or “anguish” is a 
result of the freedom of choice and forces man to confront both the appeal and terror of 
the responsibility afforded by free will—popularly known as the “existential crisis.” For 
the existentialists, lacking any teleological purpose, people have both the ability and 
responsibility to develop the meaning of their own lives and should live them 
authentically and passionately. Importantly, for both the devout Christian Søren 
Kierkegaard and the atheist Jean-Paul Sartre, individuals must embark on an authentic, 
lived experience to find their own purpose in a fundamentally meaningless world.  
While some fulfill this imperative through innocuous activities as diverse as 
parenting and skydiving, others find war and violence to be the “ultimate experience” 
whose life-affirming ability is unequaled.20 For Nietzsche, who knew war as a young 
man, strife was “the perpetual food of the soul.”21 From Tolstoy to Ernst Jünger to 
American Sniper, the inner experience of war and violence is distinguished as inimitable 
and uniquely transformational. The extremes of war push people beyond their limits and 
test their constitution in the most difficult of circumstances, producing what popular 
discourse often describes as the most authentic of life experiences; one that reveals the 
truth about the world and offers meaning to its participants.22 While political science, 
                                                 
19 Camus, The Rebel, 101. 
20 The phrase “ultimate experience” here is borrowed from the title of Yuval N. Harari, The Ultimate 
Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450-2000 (Basingstoke, UK ; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
21 Quoted in Rebekah S. Peery, Nietzsche on War (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 137. 
22 Harari, The Ultimate Experience, 10. 
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sociology and psychology have brought us far in understanding motivations toward 
terrorism, philosophy can expand our knowledge even further. 
Two lines of evidence suggest that the existential motivation is of particular 
importance to modern terrorism. The first is the nature of modern life or the influence of 
the “condition of modernity” on the psycho-social development of the individual. A 
lacuna in meaning-in-life for many may simply be a feature of modern life.23 Here, 
modernity is a general term reflecting what Anthony Giddens defines as the “modes of 
social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century 
onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.”24 
These modes reflect a turn away from traditional society, religion and the social norms 
that had grounded society to predictable, stable structures. By the turn of the 19th 
century, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists alike recognized the unmooring 
effects of modernity and its potential to alienate individuals and atomize society, creating 
a kind of social strain Émile Durkheim termed anomie.25  
Today, modernity is even more liquid, in Zygmunt Bauman’s term, with rapid 
changes in information technology, economic structure and social archetypes shifting at 
an ever faster pace on a global level. Today, life is increasingly characterized most 
fundamentally by uncertainty.26 In liquid modernity, traditional patterns of life and 
meaning-in-life must be replaced by self-chosen ones.27 Given this environment, the loss 
of traditional sources of meaning-in-life must be supplanted by others, and it is through 
terrorism that many are finding their new “reasons for living.” Like the narrator from 
Dostoyevsky’s Notes from Underground, a modern terrorist, too, might be overheard 
                                                 
23 Sandra Carlisle, Gregor Henderson, and Phil W. Hanlon, “‘Wellbeing’: A Collateral Casualty of 
Modernity?,” Social Science & Medicine 69, no. 10 (November 2009): 1559, 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.08.029. 
24 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 1. 
25 Émile Durkheim, Suicide, a Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson 
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951), 254. 
26 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000), 21. 
27 Zygmunt Bauman, On the World and Ourselves, 1st ed. (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2015), 8. 
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saying, “I made up adventures and devised a life for myself so as to live, at least 
somehow, a little.”28 
The second line of evidence comes from the burgeoning field of the psychology 
of the meaning of life and the recognition of its fundamental importance to human 
development and living a fulfilled life. Far from simply a philosophical or rhetorical 
exercise, modern psychology understands the term meaning-in-life as a core part of what 
constitutes being human. Indeed, meaning-in-life directly affects both psychological and 
physiological well-being, affecting stress levels and happiness and presaging 
susceptibility to factors as diverse as substance abuse and fear.29 When individuals face a 
lack of meaning, they often attempt to reconstruct meaning through alternative methods, 
and action and lived experience are the most effective means of doing so.30 
Supporting a qualitative theory requires marshalling factual material in such a 
way described best by Anatol Rapoport, “that the reader who views this ‘evidence’ 
through the metaphors, concepts, and definitions of which the ‘theory’ is constructed will 
have the experience of ‘understanding.’”31 In that light, this thesis approaches the 
existential problem in terrorism from a multidisciplinary perspective. The fields of social 
psychology, happiness studies, cognitive science, and even tourism and sport studies 
offer significant contributions to our understandings of meaning-in-life, its importance, 
and its development. Most importantly, they provide empirical evidence that substantiates 
its place within the hierarchy of motivations to terror and political violence and the 
                                                 
28 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, 
Everyman’s Library 271 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 17. 
29 For a review of the evidence, see Sheryl Zika and Kerry Chamberlain, “On the Relation between 
Meaning-in-life and Psychological Well-Being,” British Journal of Psychology 83, no. 1 (February 1, 
1992): 133–45, doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1992.tb02429.x. 
30 Kristin L. Sommer, Roy F. Baumeister, and Tyler F. Stillman, “The Construction of Meaning from 
Life Events: Empirical Studies of Personal Narratives,” in The Human Quest for Meaning: Theories, 
Research, and Applications, ed. Paul T. P. Wong, 2nd ed, Personality and Clinical Psychology Series (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 299–300; Leaf Van Boven and Thomas Gilovich, “To Do or to Have? That Is the 
Question,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85, no. 6 (2003): 199–200, doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.85.6.1193; Peter A. Caprariello and Harry T. Reis, “To Do, to Have, or to Share? Valuing 
Experiences over Material Possessions Depends on the Involvement of Others.,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 104, no. 2 (February 2013): 210, doi:10.1037/a0030953. 
31 Anatol Rapoport, “Various Meanings of ‘Theory’.,” American Political Science Review 52, no. 4 
(December 1958): 981–82, doi:10.2307/1951979. 
 8 
mechanisms though with the search for meaning influences behavior. Together, these two 
lines of evidence suggest that meaning-in-life is of the utmost importance, that it is 
lacking for some in modernity, that it can be manufactured by an individual, and that 
experience-through-action is the most effective means toward achieving meaning.  
Demonstrating the existential drive in terrorism also requires its validity to hold 
across both time and culture. To do so, this thesis utilizes David Rapoport’s “Four Waves 
of Modern Terrorism” to select cases from divergent eras, geographies, ideologies and 
cultures. Rapoport identifies four core “waves” of terrorism, each representing cycles of 
violence lasting about a human generation in duration. Composed of both individuals and 
organizations, the waves are international in character and are motivated by a “common 
predominant energy.”32 Recent evidence suggests that the waves are not simply a 
rhetorical device or a retroactive historical classification, but are a real, empirically 
demonstrable phenomenon.33  
In the what we now conceive of as the first wave of terrorism, the Russian 
anarchists introduced the super-empowered individual terrorist bent on changing the 
course of human history, and themselves in the process. After the end of the anarchist 
wave, a nationalist, anti-colonialist wave emerged through the 1970s. The Basque 
terrorist organization and separatist movement, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), offers 
insight into the motivations for terrorism inside a nationalist group with a clear grievance 
and well defined and bounded source of aggrieved recruits. The third wave of terrorism, 
or “new left” terrorism, is of particular interest since its most prominent groups grew and 
operated in western, secular, highly developed democracies. Of these, the Red Army 
Faction (RAF), popularly known as the “Baader-Meinhof Gang” offers extensive primary 
source evidence of the motivations and self-reported emotions of its key members. The 
RAF’s growth, persistence in the face of its early leadership’s capture, and its unique 
                                                 
32 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 47. 
33 Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 21, no. 1 (January 5, 2009): 37, doi:10.1080/09546550802544425. 
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collaboration with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) illuminates the 
organizational-level implications of existential motivations. 
Finally, today in the fourth wave of terrorism, the organization variously known 
as the “Islamic State” (IS) or the “Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham” (ISIS) appears to 
explicitly understand the power of intrinsic motivations for pursing terrorism. This is 
especially apparent in its propaganda and recruiting materials aimed at elite and western 
audiences.34 Several thousand young men and women have traveled to Syria and Iraq, 
leaving behind comfortable, if imperfect western lives for a life of intense violence, 
suffering and struggle.35 While some of these individuals are doubtlessly social outcasts, 
many others are educated professionals from middle class backgrounds where atavistic 
tendencies should not be expected. The case of the Islamic State demonstrates that 
existential motivations are not just artifacts of history, but current problems that must be 
better understood if counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism (CVE) programs 
are to effectively grapple with the full complexity of the sources of modern terrorism.  
The idea that propensity toward terrorism may lie in an essential element of the 
human condition or might arise from the malaise of modernity is a disturbing proposition. 
Externally motivated political violence is susceptible to efforts to change the strategic 
calculations of rational actors. In contrast, internally motivated actors represent a 
significant vulnerability for which counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts 
offer no treatment. These individuals defy western assumptions of universal materialist, 
rational instrumentalism and often rise into the highest ranks of leadership of violent 
organizations. Distressingly, counter-violent extremism programs pursued by western 
governments operate on core premises grounded in the rational choice theory of terrorism 
and radicalization theory.36 Individuals who find their only source of individual meaning 
                                                 
34 Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 1st ed. (New York: Ecco Press, 2015), 77. 
35 Ibid., 78–79. 
36 For an overview of rational choice based counter-radicalization theories, see David J. Kilcullen, 
“Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (August 1, 2005): 597–617, 
doi:10.1080/01402390500300956; Lorenzo Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization 
in the Netherlands,” CTC Sentinel 30, no. 7 (2007): 579–590; Samuel J. Rascoff, “Establishing Official 
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through terrorism cannot simply be dissuaded from their path by rational, utility based 




II. MODELS OF TERRORISM 
The study of why individuals become terrorists, like the broader field of terrorism, 
is the subject of a vast literature, but surprisingly little consensus.37 Approaches abound 
to the study of the problem. Studies exist at the individual, group, state and even 
international level of analysis and methodological heterogeneity continues within each 
level of analysis. Broadly though, the explanations for the individual turn toward violence 
fall within two popular schools of inquiry: rational choice and psychological.38 Rational 
choice forms the dominant theoretical school, explaining terrorism as a logical, 
instrumental choice in response to political grievances. In contrast, the psychological 
model considers the individual level of analysis, focusing upon the mind, personalities 
and behavior. Combining aspects of both approaches, radicalization theory examines 
terrorists with a multidisciplinary integration of psychology and rational choice along 
pathways and processes toward terrorism. Within radicalization, the role of social 
networks merits special attention, locating terrorism’s sources in the interplay of 
individuals with their social networks and society. These schools are not mutually 
exclusive, and each draws upon the others to inform theory. Each also suffers from 
weaknesses that result in their failure to explain the turn to violence for a significant 
number of terrorists.   
A. RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS 
Rational choice, also variously known as the instrumental or strategic model, 
continues to be the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies today. Within this model, 
individual terrorists are utility maximizers, pursuing political violence to achieve the 
maximum gains for their interests. In terrorism, as viewed through the lens of classical 
economic theory, the rational model hinges upon three fundamental assumptions:  
                                                 
37 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 1st ed., Cass Series on Political Violence (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 1. 
38 A third school, the organizational approach, finds terrorism’s roots in the dynamics and ideologies 
of groups. It is not examined in detail here since its level of analysis is above that of the individual. See 
Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003): 
473–507, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085601. 
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(1) terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political 
preferences; (2) terrorists evaluate the expected political payoffs of their 
available options, or at least the most obvious ones; and (3) terrorism is 
adopted when the expected political return is superior to those of 
alternative options.39 
Though terrorism is rarely effective in achieving the often maximalist goals of 
terrorist organizations,40 it is a rational, instrumental tool of political change.41 Terrorism 
is also strategic, meaning that the consequence of each action are evaluated with respect 
to their consequences and are directed in the most efficient manner. Terrorist acts are also 
costly signals used to communicate intent and capability toward political gains.42 From 
this perspective, violence is merely a means to an end, and is but one of many alternatives 
in a strategic game.43 
A corollary to this school is the search for so called “root causes”—underlying 
social, economic, political, and demographic conditions that cause terrorist activity. If 
terrorism’s objective is political, its cause must be as well. Here, the grievances of the 
population arising from some sort of deprivation or oppression interact with precipitating 
events to produce the response of terrorism. Empirical studies find explanations for 
terrorism in poverty, demographic strain, political exclusion, political and social change, 
identity, foreign military invention and geopolitics.44 More promising recent empirical 
works find terrorism more narrowly linked to human rights abuses of governments and 
the political exclusion of minorities, but remain focused upon environmental 
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doi:10.1080/07388940701643607. 
 13 
antecedents.45 Each of these factors doubtlessly contributes to the formation of terrorist 
groups and the radicalization of individual terrorists, but neither individually nor together 
are they necessary and sufficient causes. 
The rational model and its root cause corollary are especially dominant in the 
policy arena. Counterterrorism and counter-violent extremism strategies executed by the 
United States and European governments often seek to shift the utility calculation made 
by terrorists—either by making it more costly to pursue, or less likely to achieve the 
desired aims. Yet, it is unclear whether such an approach is truly grounded in sound 
theory or is effective at all. Were poverty, discrimination and grievance the lone or even 
primary motivators of terrorism, terrorist acts would be expected far more often they 
actually occur. Nor is terrorism the sole or dominant province of the poor and 
downtrodden. The anarchist terrorism at the turn of the 20th century, the left-wing 
terrorism of the 1970s and ‘80s, and even the leadership of Al Qaeda largely drew from 
the privileged and educated. Even with a broad definition of “rational,” the pure 
instrumentality of terrorism toward a political objective cannot alone explain the 
individual decision to pursue its use.  
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 
The second broad field of terrorism studies focuses on the psychology of 
terrorism. If there are no clear necessary and sufficient environmental causes of terrorism, 
its source must arise from the mind. Violence is not a willful choice in this model, but 
rather terrorists turn to violent means through psychological forces.46 Individual 
psychological traits or abnormalities combine with upbringing and environment to lead 
an individual down a path toward violence. It is psychology which draws individuals 
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toward the path of terrorism with logical and external causes only forming ex post facto 
justifications or helping to accelerate or catalyze changes.  
Early psychological perspectives attempted to locate a deviant explanation for 
terrorism and operated from the assumption that terrorists must be insane or 
psychopathic.47 Though it remained a dominant popular view for some time, the 
simplistic psychopathic hypothesis was quickly dismissed with forensic psychological 
examinations of terrorists in the 1970s.48 Later psychological approaches sought to 
develop a terrorist profile from characteristics both internal and external to the individual. 
Demographic studies from the 1960s and 1970s focused upon a simplistic socioeconomic 
profile, finding the median terrorist to be “a well-educated single male in his mid-
twenties from a middle-class background.”49 Analyses from the 1980s onward examined 
more complex psychological factors including personality traits and upbringing. A 
general characterization of terrorists as aggressive, excitement-seeking individuals arose 
from these efforts, but few characteristics distinguish violent terrorists from mere 
philosophical radicals. Terrorists are either poor, middle-class or wealthy; unschooled 
and unskilled or well-educated; and from many different kinds of families and 
upbringings, suggesting little that is generalizable about those who turn to political 
violence.50   
In a more complex psychological approach to understanding an individual’s turn 
to violence and terrorism, two related psychological hypotheses emerged beyond the 
reductionist profiling approach. Bridging between psychology and external motivations, 
                                                 
47 H. H. A. Cooper, “Psychopath as Terrorist,” Legal Medical Quarterly 2 (1978): 253. 
48 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 390. 
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the frustration-aggression hypothesis seeks to explain how deprivation can cause a turn to 
violence. Here, aggression or terrorism emerges as a response to the “frustration” of an 
individual’s attempt to achieve a goal.51 Others have adapted this theory to suggest that 
depravation need not be absolute, but only needs to be relative to others observed to 
provoke frustration.52 While frustration-aggression may explain a subset of terrorists, it 
cannot do so more widely. Seeking to account for other hypotheses’ weaknesses, 
narcissism-aggression explains terrorism’s attractiveness through how the individual’s 
ego interacts with the external world. Narcissistic injury and disappointment, where a 
person’s self-worth and image has been harmed leads to resentment that must be avenged 
through aggression.53 While an ex post study of terrorist autobiographical literature 
found narcissism’s presence in up to 90% of terrorists, its causal validity remains 
uncertain.54 Neither hypothesis stands alone as a complete explanation of the individual 
decision to pursue terrorism, nor does current psychological research appear to be any 
closer to a complete model. 
Decades of terrorism research largely belies any notion of a unique “terrorist 
personality,” profile or a single psychological causal mechanism.55 The consensus of 
decades of psychological profiles of individual terrorists finds but one commonality—
their essential normalness.56 Explaining terrorism though abnormal psychology is 
intuitively attractive as a simple explanation of a complex phenomenon. Antisocial, 
                                                 
51 H.G. Tittmar, “Urban Terrorism: A Psychological Interpretation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
4, no. 3 (September 1, 1992): 65–66, doi:10.1080/09546559208427160. 
52 See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 40th anniversary ed (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 
2010). 
53 Richard M. Pearlstein, The Mind of the Political Terrorist (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1991), 35. 
54 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 59; Pearlstein, The Mind of the Political Terrorist, 7. 
55 Jerrold M. Post, “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior,” Terrorism 7, no. 2 
(January 1, 1984): 242, doi:10.1080/10576108408435577; Robin M. Frost, “Terrorist Psychology, 
Motivation and Strategy,” The Adelphi Papers 45, no. 378 (December 1, 2005): 42, 
doi:10.1080/05679320500519039; Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and 
Consequences, Cass Series on Political Violence (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011), 43–44; Horgan, 
The Psychology of Terrorism, 48. 
56 Horgan, “The Search for the Terrorist Personality,” 16–17; Silke, “Cheshire-Cat Logic,” 53; Clark 
McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 12; Christine Sixta Rinehart, Volatile Social Movements and the 
Origins of Terrorism: The Radicalization of Change (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 7. 
 16 
narcissistic and paranoid personality types have striking similarities to terrorist behavior, 
but have not been found to be predictive or prevalent in actual terrorists.57 Evil, as it was 
in the case of Adolph Eichmann, is essentially banal in the case of individual terrorists.58  
C. RADICALIZATION 
Though not distinct as a separate school of terrorism studies, radicalization theory 
combines the rational and psychological frames to explore the problem as a dynamic 
process across time through which individuals become terrorists. Though poorly defined 
in the literature, radicalization, in its most simple form, is described as a process by 
which an individual’s desire to see and then personally participate in interest in profound 
societal changes increases.59 There must be a change in the nature and intensity of an 
individual’s beliefs for radicalization to occur. In this sense, the radicalization approach 
seeks to understand both what people believe and how they come to believe it. 
Radicalization also has both a functional component, where it is a process by which 
individuals and social groups advance in their commitment and preparation to social 
change and violence.60   
Radicalization has no single cause and exhibits different characteristics for 
different people in similar circumstances. Much like the literature in the psychological 
approach, there is little agreement upon the individual dimensions of the pathway to 
radicalization and individuals exhibit a high level of equifinality toward radical positions 
and acts. Causal factors identified in the broader body of literature demonstrate a division 
between deprivation and political grievances that are said to “push” individuals toward a 
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radical cause and individualized “pull” factors that attract them along a pathway.61 The 
pathway need not be linear either. For some, ideology leads to them to join a group, while 
for others, social networks lead to ideological commitment.62  
Radicalization is also often described as a change facilitated by people and 
processes external to the individuals,63 though self-radicalization is a sub-phenomenon in 
the literature.64 Social networks exert a significant influence on the process of 
radicalization toward terrorism. Individuals do not make decisions in isolation, but are 
instead highly shaped by other actors in the networks in which they exist.65 The attributes 
of a person may be individually important, but they often cannot alone explain 
similarities and differences in behavior because they ignore the broader social and 
relational context in which actors interact.66 Patterns of interaction and ties with other 
humans, events, and places among other relational ties have a disparate impact in the 
process of radicalization.67   
While each individual may enter a terrorist group with their own predispositions, 
the group dynamic and the ties that form between individuals will have a profound 
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impact on how they make decisions. The density of a network can also affect behavior. 
Sparse networks tend to lack social control mechanisms that prevent deviant behavior, 
while denser networks often exhibit greater levels of conformity to social norms.68 Each 
of these patterns of behavior is an emergent property of the relationship ties and 
topography of networks of actors and exists irrespective of individual attributes. In short, 
our agency as humans is circumscribed by our place in the social networks in which we 
exist. 
Though typically intertwined with radical Islamic terrorism in the most recent 
research, radicalization need not be negative or necessarily associated directly with 
violence. Causes as diverse as environmentalism, disabled rights and animal rights all 
have produced radicalized fringes.69 Though the models vary, they generally include 
stages of progressively greater involvement in a cause that begins from a feeling of 
grievance and deprivation. Grievances, rather than being purely rational motivators 
toward terrorism here are part of a pathway. Individuals are radicalized through 
individual, group and societal level processes where personal victimization, political 
grievances, and group dynamics coalesce to push and pull an individual on a pathway to 
violent radicalism.70 Each stage of radicalization is reached by fewer people and most 
never reach the level of actually engaging in terrorism. However, within the primary 
models of radicalization toward terrorism, violence is the ultimate outcome.  
Generically, radicalization can be distilled into a process with stages described as 
pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action. In pre-radicalization, an 
individual experiences a conversion of personal belief. Identification is the process of 
deepening the identification toward the cause and the development of a binary “us-
versus-them” outlook toward an out-group. Here an individual may receive reinforcing 
guidance from others involved in the cause. Indoctrination is group-level process that 
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develops social ties increasing commitment to a cause and the propensity for action.71 
Finally, action describes the execution of terrorist activities after all barriers and 
inhibitions are removed. Other models augment this process with additional steps that 
explain the removal of inhibitions toward violence and ideological shifts, but the process 
is generally consistent across the body of literature.72  
Radicalization theory suffers from several flaws that complicate its explanatory 
value. Root causes form the base of radicalization while psychological and sociological 
processes move individuals toward terrorism. Most mechanisms in radicalization are 
external to the individual and neither alone nor together are they necessary and sufficient 
to predict terrorism. Furthermore, radicalization explains few of the catalysts that activate 
the process. Even less is known about the relative importance of individual factors. Few 
individuals become radicalized, and even fewer actually employ violence. Ultimately, 
radicalization accumulates the weaknesses of the rational choice and psychosocial 
theories from which it is derived, leaving its empirical validity uncertain and explanatory 
value incomprehensive.   
D. SUMMARY 
Walter Laqueur warns that the quest for a “general theory” of terrorism is 
misguided, writing that “many terrorisms exist, and their character has changed over time 
and from country to country.”73 There are thousands of articles, monographs and books 
approaching terrorism as a “crime of logic.” A post-9/11 conference to reach a consensus 
upon the root causes of terrorism identified fourteen separate antecedents to terrorism, all 
with loci external to the individual terrorist.74 Psychological and radicalization 
approaches also largely rely on an etiological framework.75 Yet, it is clear that these 
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models are insufficient. Camus’ “crimes of passion” arise from a source still unexplained 
by these models—and though it may still be rational, it need not be instrumental or 
political in goal. A new model is needed—one that complements, rather than replaces the 
rational choice and psychological models with a nuanced, but dynamic appreciation of 
internal motivations toward violence.  
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III. THE EXISTENTIAL MODEL 
It is not particularly new to suggest that motivations internal to the mind are 
important to understand an individual’s turn toward violence and war. There is no 
shortage of literature extolling the distinctive aesthetics of war and violence, proffering 
romantic vision of its experience. The modern conception of war as a crucible of 
experience where men are baptized by fire and forged through tests of strength, 
endurance and conquering is a direct product of war’s place in writings of the 
enlightenment and romantic movements in Europe.76 Recent writers have even 
generalized from individual experience to suggest that war can even give meaning to 
entire societies.77 Still others have questioned whether western conceptions of violence 
and war in the 21st century have forgotten the essential humanity of war’s experience; 
eschewing the existential for an excessively rational approach to conflict.78 Indeed, the 
current view of violent conflict presupposes a kind of “war without warriors,”79 
abandoning one essential component of Clausewitz’s fascinating trinity: that of passion, 
hate and enmity.80 The last remaining vestige of any understanding of war’s existential 
attraction seems to be acknowledged today only implicitly in the language of U.S. 
military recruitment literature and media and by our illiberal adversaries.81 
After years of research dominated by the rational model, there appears to be a 
recent return to reflection upon the intrinsic motivations toward violence and terrorism. 
Extrapolating from the aesthetic literature on the experience of war, Simon Cottee and 
Keith Hayward argue motivation toward terrorism comes from desire for excitement, 
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glory and ultimate meaning.82 For them, the experience of terrorism, as felt through 
human emotions, is as important as the justifications and expected outcomes of 
terrorism.83 Megan McBride goes further, placing the philosophical, existential 
attractions of terrorism identified by others within the framework of psychology’s terror 
management theory (TMT).84 Alternatively, Max Abrahms suggests that terrorism can be 
an escape from alienation, offering social bonds and group identity to those otherwise 
separated from their society.85 These recent breaks from the rational model are 
constructive and valuable, but their conclusions have yet to be empirically tested nor have 
their mechanisms been deeply theorized and investigated.   
Excitement or glory may each be important, but they cannot stand alone as the 
motivating factors. Alienation and the need for social solidarity too may offer significant 
insights into the attraction to terrorism, but cannot exist alone either. Glory, excitement, 
and group solidarity are merely among the means through which ultimate meaning-in-life 
can be created. As explanations, they must exist within a wider psychological context, 
framework of human nature, and hierarchy of existential needs. However, to properly 
bring existential motivations into the study of terrorism, it is necessary to empirically 
demonstrate their importance and the mechanisms through which they function. In the 
service of this, multi-disciplinary social science can demonstrate both the importance of 
meaning, its status in our modern world, and its effect on both the individual and societal 
level processes that push individuals toward terrorism.    
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A. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEANING 
In a world of suffering, violence, death, inequality, and other displeasures, 
imagine a device that would allow any person to decouple from the often terrible realities 
of the world and experience constant, pure pleasure and enjoyment. Such a machine 
could stimulate your neural impulses in such a way that you would feel like “you were 
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book.”86 This world 
would be a complete fiction; merely a simulation of events which never occurred and had 
no external manifestation outside the artificially stimulated mind. While attached to the 
machine, one would know only the reality constructed therein and would have no 
conception of an external world where time and authentic experience continued. Yet, in 
this machine, an individual would experience his or her wildest dreams, pleasures, and 
events impossible in ordinary life or with the resources of a normal person. Despite the 
undeniable prima facie appeal of such a life, few who contemplate the true ramifications 
of the “experience machine” would voluntarily subjugate their reality to connect to its 
simulations.87  
Robert Nozick proposes this “experience machine” as a thought experiment 
questioning the validity of the hedonistic perspective on life’s purpose as simply the 
pursuit of pleasure.88 Several millennia ago, the Greek Cyrenaics, Epicureans and more 
recently, 19th-century utilitarian philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stewart Mill 
among others promulgated the hedonistic belief that pleasure in life was the only true 
good. Yet, given the choice, most would reject pure pleasure for a life of authenticity, 
connectedness and transcendent meaning even if it inevitably portends some level of 
suffering, pain, and sadness. Nozick’s thought experiment reveals that there are things 
which matter to us more than simply having certain experiences or possessions. Nozick 
writes that, “we want to do certain things and not just have the experience of having done 
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them.”89 Most importantly, we want to become a unique person, distinguished from all 
others. Nozick even implies that simply plugging in to the machine is akin to committing 
a form of “suicide.”90 Even the use of video-games, the closest analog that exists to an 
actual “experience machine,” validate Nozick’s hypothesis with social, multiplayer 
games representing a preponderance of gaming activity.91 Humans want to be connected 
to a reality greater than our internal selves.  
The meaning of life in general and, meaning-in-life and its attainment is a core 
philosophical theme in the western canon. Alongside the philosophical, the theological 
sources of meaning in the Christian and Jewish traditions also heavily influence its 
conception in the western world. From the Platonic ideal of knowledge and the 
Aristotelian ideal of virtue, to the hedonic utilitarians and Continental philosophy, 
meaning holds a central place in the thought across time and traditions. No story is more 
opposite the “experience machine” than that of Sisyphus. Banished to Hades by Zeus for 
keeping death away from all humanity,92 the Greek tragic hero Sisyphus, once the King 
of Corinth and the wisest of all mortals, was condemned to an eternity of pushing a 
boulder up a hill only to nearly reach to top and have it roll to the bottom again.93 Yet, in 
Camus’ re-imagination of the myth, despite the absurdity of being perpetually doomed to 
the same impossible task, he rebels against his struggle with his full energy.94 Sisyphus 
held his fate in his hands and attacked it, recognizing “there is no fate that cannot be 
surmounted by scorn.”95 He was happy and lived a perpetually meaningful life because 
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he fought against his masters (the gods). It was through continual struggle, trial and 
tribulation that Sisyphus himself, and himself alone, constructed his own meaning-in-life.  
Perhaps no philosophical tradition focuses on meaning-in-life more than 
existentialism. What distinguishes existentialism within the western philosophical 
tradition is its focus on the individual and one’s capability and responsibility to create the 
essence of one’s own life. Though it is a retroactive categorization of a wide range of 
philosophers who mostly never described themselves as such, existentialism is now a 
core school of philosophical inquiry, as well as a cultural movement.96 Counted among 
its adherents and exponents are Christians, Jews, and atheists alike.97 Similar to 
Romanticism, the 19th century largely German movement that laid the intellectual 
foundations for existentialism, it represents a break from the rationalist philosophies that 
had come to dominate European thought during the enlightenment.98 Counter to the 
fundamental precepts of the enlightenment, for the romantics not everything was 
measureable and prescribable to reason. Romanticism sought a return to subjectivity and 
spontaneity where emotions and passions matter and recognized a limit upon logic and 
reasoning’s ability to explain the world.99 Existentialism breaks from romanticism and 
builds upon it by looking beyond our nature to question the very meaning of our 
existence. 
Though it has roots deep into ancient Greek philosophy, modern existentialism is 
generally considered to begin with ideas of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard 
(1813–1855). Kierkegaard explored the philosophy of individual choice, anxiety, 
alienation and death from a perspective of deep Christian faith. Friedrich Nietzsche 
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(1844–1900) is perhaps existentialism’s most influential progenitor. Running through the 
core of Nietzsche’s philosophy is the idea of individual life affirmation.100 Familiar, but 
complex concepts like the übermensch, the will to power, eternal recurrence and amor 
fati all assert the individual’s power; a power of creation and overcoming. Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky (1821–1881) and Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) both wrote literature in the 
existential tradition examining the empowered individual. In the 20th century, Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) further developed 
existentialist thought and, in the case of Sartre, brought it into the popular imagination. 
Though, with the qualified exception of Sartre, none of these philosophers ever self-
categorized themselves as existentialists, read together they each contribute to what we 
think of as existentialism today.  
Just as with other philosophical schools of thought, philosophers in the 
existentialist tradition disagree on both details and fundamentals. It is neither the place, 
nor is there space in this work to outline the full depth and breadth of existentialist 
thought. Yet, it is possible to sketch a broad outline of existentialism’s theory of the 
meaning of life, its importance, its constituents, and development. Here, existentialism 
posits both a problem with finding meaning-in-life and a solution. It is from this 
dichotomy that we can gain the most insight on the existential drive and its relation to 
modern terrorism. Existentialist thought has long emphasized the potential occurrence of 
a moment where a person confronts the essential absurdity of the world and its lack of 
teleological meaning. These so-called, “existential crises” produce what philosophers 
have variously termed, angst, anxiety, dread, anguish, or nausea. A consequence of the 
individual’s realization of meaninglessness and the emptiness of the universe, without the 
traditional anchor of religion, existential angst is not just a fleeting state, but is in fact, a 
universal condition of human existence.101 Absent any teleology, humans have the 
essential freedom to create purpose in their own lives.  
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Like the inquiry of this thesis, existentialism primarily explores the individual and 
the nature of being in the world.102 Individuals are important, separate from any 
categorization, and they can define their own world. Famously for Sartre, “man first 
exists; he materializes in the world, encounters himself, and only afterward defines 
himself.”103 That is to say as Sartre puts it, “existence precedes essence” or more simply, 
that there is no “human nature.”104 This contrasts strongly with the traditional Platonic 
and Aristotelian premise that essence precedes existence, whereby man is at birth 
endowed with a teleological purpose and an immutable nature.105 Given its focus on the 
individual, existentialism heavily emphasizes action, freedom, and decision as 
fundamental to human existence. For Sartre, man is born without inherent purpose and is 
responsible for defining his or her own meaning of existence. However, beyond one’s 
responsibility for giving his or her life its own meaning is the responsibility to live it 
passionately and sincerely, or more accurately, authentically.106  
B. THE SCIENCE OF MEANING 
Once confined merely to the realm of philosophers, modern sociology and social 
psychology recognize meaning’s centrality to human development and living a fulfilling 
life. Across the 20th century, existentialist thought slowly began to influence other fields 
in science and social science, but largely remained peripheral to other viewpoints. The 
exploration of meaning and its importance only truly entered the mainstream of 
psychology with the writings and theories of Rollo May and Viktor Frankl.107 A survivor 
of Auschwitz and a trained psychotherapist, Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning 
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and the methods of psychotherapy he developed from his experiences in Auschwitz have 
had a profound influence on psychology in the latter half of the 20th century.108 Echoing 
the ancient Stoics, Frankl argues that “everything can be taken from a man but one thing: 
the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of 
circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”109 Frankl later developed logotherapy, a 
practical application of existential philosophical concepts to treat psychological 
conditions. Today, existential psychology is a thriving branch of positive psychology and 
represents both a significant approach to the clinical practice of psychology and a 
research program on the sources of psychological well-being and meaning-in-life.  
Because of its centrality to human nature and its subjectivity, meaning is a 
difficult concept to define. At its core, meaning is an integrating function that provides a 
person the ability to make sense of life, organize their place in the world, anchor 
themselves to relative to others, and plan for the future.110 More narrowly, Baumeister 
offers that meaning is a “mental representation of possible relationships among things, 
events, and relationships. Thus, meaning connects things.”111 Having the capacity to 
process meaning gives humans the capability to both regulate and experience a wider 
range of emotions and categorize the world and its signals and patterns.112 From this, 
meaning-in-life becomes a related concept that has its own constituents.  
Baumeister further categorizes the needs into four main categories of meaning: 
purpose, value, efficacy, and self-worth.113 Purpose is a sense that one’s life is organized 
and directed toward the future, goals and possibilities.114 Having purpose allows 
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individuals to understand their current state and relate it to the future and its possibilities. 
Purpose does not have to be goal oriented. It can be fulfilled by intrinsically satisfying 
activities as well as those that offer concrete, extrinsic results.115 The second category, 
value, relates to the sense that one’s actions and life are being lived in the service of what 
is deemed normatively good and right.116 Efficacy is the human need to believe that 
one’s life is under one’s own control. It is not simply enough to have goals and to believe 
those goals are moral and justified, a person must also believe that the achievement of 
their purpose is feasible.117 Finally, meaning-in-life also requires positive self-worth.118  
Those individuals possessing all four categories of meaning in their lives as 
outlined by Baumeister, generally report their lives are very meaningful. In contrast, a 
lack of any single factor can result in inadequate levels of subjective meaningfulness.119 
In a more comprehensive framework, Reker and Wong identify twelve categories of 
sources of meaning:  
(a) meeting such basic needs as food, shelter, and safety; (b) leisure 
activities or hobbies; (c) creative work; (d) personal achievement 
(education or career); (f) personal growth (wisdom or maturity); (g) social 
or political activism (e.g., the peace movement or anti-pollution 
campaigns); (h) altruism; (i) enduring values and ideals (truth, goodness, 
beauty and justice); (j) traditions and culture, including heritage or ethno-
cultural associations; (k) legacy (leaving a mark for posterity); and (l) 
religion.120  
While the mix of needs may vary individually, these categories range from the 
basic needs that are fundamental to simply sustaining life to the transcendent and 
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spiritual. Simplified, meaning-in-life is a multifaceted concept that includes both a sense 
of fulfillment in one’s current situation and purpose toward the future.121   
Meaning can also be bifurcated it into two levels: global and situational.122 
Global meaning addresses how individuals place their lives in larger context and attain 
purpose and coherence.123 In other words, the “experience of meaning” revers to having 
order, purpose in existence and the resulting sense of fulfillment.124 In contrast, 
situational meaning refers to how personal significance is created by specific events in 
one’s life.125 Simplified, it is the “meaning of experience.”126 While they are separate 
concepts, global and situational meaning operate together, with situational meaning 
functioning as the direct contributor to global meaning.  
Global meaning is particularly important to overall well-being. Reker and Wong 
propose a triangular model of meaning with cognitive, motivational and affective 
components (see Figure 1). The cognitive component reflects that cultural, societal and 
temporal aspects of meaning that influence the selection of goals and actions. The 
motivational component reflects internal wants, needs and goals that help produce 
fulfillment and happiness in the affective component. The model also contains feedback 
loops that reflect the motivational and affective components’ abilities to strengthen and 
validate the cognitive component, and promote the affective component’s push toward 
goal attainment. At their acme, a person with high personal meaning should be 
comfortable in their worldview and beliefs, with purpose in life directing goals and 
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action.127 Each component is reliant on the others for the model to function, and thus 
personal meaning can breakdown if each is not being fulfilled. 
 Structure of Personal Meaning128 Figure 1. 
 
Reker and Wong’s three-component model of the structure of personal meaning. The 
solid arrows represent the direction of influence and dashed arrows represent feedback. 
Happiness and meaning-in-life are not synonymous concepts, but are still closely 
related. Happiness is largely situational and is generally conceived as a subjective state of 
being that has “a positive affective tone.”129 It can come from individual experiences and 
can be the result of an accumulation of both positive and negative emotions that results in 
a sense of having a happy life. Happiness scholarship divides an individual’s sense of 
happiness into two categories.130 The first is the affective component which refers to 
individual positive and negative feelings about discrete events. The second is a cognitive 
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component reflecting an individual’s sense of life satisfaction. These two components 
represent both how happiness is created and how it is cognitively conceived within the 
mind of the individual.  
There also exists a distinction between individual happiness and an individual’s 
conception of a good life.131 Aristotle held that the ultimate aim in life was to strive to 
realize one’s true potential, and through this struggle one could reach a state which he 
called “Eudaimonia,” variously translated as “happiness” or more accurately “human 
flourishing.” As philosopher Thomas Nagel notes, Eudaimonia operates along the “the 
full range of human life and action,” and is achieved when one lives “in accordance with 
the broader excellences of moral virtue and practical wisdom.”132 Modern psychologists 
have more closely explored Eudaimonia, searching for its components and sources. 
Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of needs holds a close parallel to Eudaimonic 
conceptions of well-being.133 From his typology and the work of other positive 
psychologists and happiness researchers, Carol Ryff developed a six-factor model of 
Eudaimonic well-being that accounts for the totality of factors that can produce “human 
flourishing.”134 Autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, purpose in life, 
environmental mastery and positive relations with others represent sub-components of 
well-being that contribute to the whole.135 Later empirical research has explored the 
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relative importance of each sub-factor,136 finding “purpose in life” or meaning-in-life to 
be particularly significant, especially for youth.137 
Though methodologically difficult, a broader attempt to measure meaning-in-life 
has also been attempted both by adherents of Viktor Frankl’s logotherapy and social 
psychologists.138 Beginning in the 1960s, several frameworks and scales have been 
developed to measure meaning-in-life at the individual level, of which the Purpose-in-
Life Test, the Sense of Coherence scale, and Life Regard Index (LIR) are the most well 
regarded and utilized.139 Though these measures rely on a self-report survey 
methodology, their results correlate closely with anxiety and other measures of overall 
health and psychological well-being, suggesting they hold some empirical validity.140 
The most recent and most comprehensive attempt at measuring meaning is the Personal 
Meaning Profile (PMP), a 57-item survey developed to measure the full breadth of 
potential sources of meaning in the surveyed individual’s life that categorizes meaning 
between five separate psychological functions: cognitive, motivational, affective, 
relational, and personal.141 Though skepticism about the cross-cultural transferability of 
these measurement systems is warranted, and research is largely limited to so-called 
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WEIRD people,142 the LIR has proven to be cross-culturally valid in at least one study 
conducted in South Africa.143  
Regardless of its conception and measurement, it is nearly universally accepted 
that meaning-in-life is important to psychological well-being.144 A significant number of 
empirical studies confirm the importance of global meaning toward reducing stress, 
overcoming life’s challenges and in overall mental and physical well-being.145 In 
particular, high scores in the PMP have been positively correlated with perceived well-
being, hope, meaning of work and commitment and negatively correlated with 
depression, depressive symptoms, job stress and negative affect.146 Meaning also 
functions to reduce stress during times of change and uncertainty and assists recovery 
from trauma and tragedy.147 Far from being simply an ungrounded philosophical 
concept, there is significant evidence that the internal, individual concept of meaning-in-
life has concrete external effects. Importantly, one of the most profound effects may be 
combining with the global, structural changes in society that characterize the modern age 
to motivate individuals toward violence and terrorism.  
                                                 
142 White, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD), the subjects of most 
psychological research. See Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People 
in the World?,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 2–3 (June 2010): 61–83, 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999152X. 
143 Jeremias J. de Klerk, Adré B. Boshoff, and René van Wyk, “Measuring Meaning-in-life in South 
Africa: Validation of an Instrument Developed in the USA,” South African Journal of Psychology 39, no. 3 
(September 1, 2009): 321, doi:10.1177/008124630903900306. 
144 Ryff, “Happiness Is Everything, or Is It?,” 1075; Crystal L. Park, “Making Sense of the Meaning 
Literature: An Integrative Review of Meaning Making and Its Effects on Adjustment to Stressful Life 
Events,” Psychological Bulletin 136, no. 2 (2010): 257, doi:10.1037/a0018301. 
145 See Zika and Chamberlain, “On the Relation between Meaning-in-life and Psychological Well-
Being”; Suzanne M. Johnson Vickberg et al., “Intrusive Thoughts and Psychological Distress among Breast 
Cancer Survivors: Global Meaning as a Possible Protective Factor,” Behavioral Medicine 25, no. 4 (Winter 
2000): 152–60; Michael D. Newcomb and L. L. Harlow, “Life Events and Substance Use among 
Adolescents: Mediating Effects of Perceived Loss of Control and Meaninglessness in Life.,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 51, no. 3 (September 1986): 564–77, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.3.564; 
Gary T. Reker, Edward J. Peacock, and Paul T. P. Wong, “Meaning and Purpose in Life and Well-Being: A 
Life-Span Perspective,” Journal of Gerontology 42, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 44–49, 
doi:10.1093/geronj/42.1.44; Ryff and Keyes, “The Structure of Psychological Well-Being Revisited”; 
Carol D. Ryff, “Psychological Well-Being in Adult Life,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 4, 
no. 4 (1995): 99–104, doi:10.1111/1467-8721.ep10772395. 
146 McDonald, Wong, and Gingras, “Meaning-in-Life Measures and Development of a Brief Version 
of the Personal Meaning Profile,” 363. 
147 Park, “Making Sense of the Meaning Literature,” 286–88. 
 35 
C. MEANING IN MODERNITY 
The arrival of existentialist thought and its forebears in the mid-19th century is no 
accident of history. William Barrett situates existentialism’s rise within three great trends 
converging in the 19th and 20th centuries which fostered a new human “encounter with 
nothingness.”148 The decline of religion, the rise of a rationally ordered mass society and 
the impact of science’s exploration of the world radically shifted the way people 
encountered the world and caused many to question their fundamental identity and its 
sources.149 No longer was life statically centered on one’s home and family. Religion in 
Europe and the West had long anchored identity and meaning to an individual’s 
relationship to scripture, religious practice, and ultimately God. Instead, profound 
changes in religious organization, the rise of Protestantism, and the loss of a system that 
ordered everyday life from birth to death held massive implications for society as a 
whole. For Nietzsche, this meant that “God is dead,”150 not in a literal sense, but in the 
more profound understanding that morality and human existence was no longer chained 
to a fixed, unquestioned set of rules, symbols, rituals, and concepts that flowed from the 
belief and faith in the divine and transcendent.  
There has long been widespread recognition of a generalized lacuna in meaning 
that accompanied modernity’s arrival. Francis Fukuyama ends his influential commentary 
“The End of History?” with a poignant coda to his analysis of the future of the post-Cold 
War international system:  
The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, 
the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide 
ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and 
idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of 
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technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of 
sophisticated consumer demands.151  
Fukuyama does not suggest that the “end of history” is inevitable and final. Indeed, he 
recognizes the “danger that we will be happy on one level, but still dis-satisfied with 
ourselves on another, and hence ready to drag the world back into history with all its 
wars, injustice and revolution”152 Fukuyama’s lament is not original; it is only echoing a 
critique and fear of modernity’s impact that has its roots in the philosophy, sociology and 
psychology of the 19th century.  
Early sociologists and modern social science have affirmed the philosophers’ 
conceptions of meaning and its centrality to life. In the 19th century, Max Weber was 
possibly the first to recognize the profound psychological and sociological implications 
of modernity. Eighty-five years before The End of History, Max Weber postulated an 
“Iron Cage” that threatened to strip humanity of meaning in existence. 
No one yet knows who will live in that shell (Gehäuse) in the future. 
Perhaps new prophets will, or powerful old ideas and ideal will be reborn 
as the end of this monstrous development. Or perhaps-if neither of these 
occurs—“Chinese” ossification, dressed up with a kind of desperate self-
importance, will set in. Then, however, it might truly be said of the “last 
man” (letzten Menschen) in this cultural development: “specialists without 
spirit, hedonists without a heart, this nonentities imagine they have 
attained a stage of humanity (Menschentums) never before reached.”153 
Industrialization, the bureaucratization of society, and the expansion of the state have 
generated incredible human and material progress, yet this advancement may come at the 
costs of creativity, autonomy and individual identity.  
Examining the causes of suicide in 19th century France, Durkheim adopted the 
term anomie from the philosophy of Jean-Marie Guyau and repurposed it to describe the 
effects of economic and social change. In Durkheim’s estimation, the rapid change in the 
values and norms of society caused by economic shifts and the reduction of organized 
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religion’s influence, led to the development of the alienation and purposelessness that 
characterized anomie.154 In practice, anomie is characterized by “frenzy, impatience, 
restlessness, feverishness, disenchantment, fatigue, excessive excitement, agitation, 
distress, exasperation, misery and insatiability (among other similar psychological 
states).”155 Anomic suicide, then, was the result of individuals becoming detached from 
society and the regulatory mechanisms it imposes on individual identity and the meaning 
of life.156 Durkheim would also later argue that changes in the division of labor brought 
on by capitalism, market economics, and industrialization that “diminished the individual 
by reducing him to the role of machine” were also sources of anomie.157 While 
Durkheim primarily recognized the dislocating effects of industrialization and capitalism, 
the shift in the fundamental social structure and organization of societies also has 
profound implications.  
Modernity is especially different than all previous paradigm shifts in social 
organization because of the speed of changes, its wholesale replacement of tradition, and 
in particular, the global nature of its impact.158 Running across the thought on modernity 
is its dislocating impact.159 Some eke out a meager existence for their family today as for 
millennia before. Yet, others in the privileged classes, free from deprivation, want and 
care now find themselves on a search for identity and meaning. Among the keenest 
analysts of the modern condition, Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman describes 
humanity’s current state as “liquid modernity.”160 In all of human history until the 
eighteenth century, people were immersed in solid societies constrained by social norms 
which changed slowly, if at all. People could structure their lives by being members of 
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their bounded and coherent society and could appraise their existence by measuring 
themselves against their society’s norms. Technology, information, capitalism, and other 
changes have shifted modernity’s emphasis from the group to the individual and have 
unmoored traditional sources of meaning. Lacking permanent bonds, the “liquid man,” in 
Bauman’s estimation, must now seek to manufacture his own meaning and purpose 
through his own skills and commitment.161  
For all the sociological and philosophical discussion of the lacuna in meaning that 
characterizes modernity, its empirical measurement across place and time remains 
lacking. Given this deficiency, the best approximation for meaning-in-life is happiness, a 
field of considerable study in economics and sociology. Though, as discussed earlier, 
happiness and meaning-in-life are not perfectly synonymous, they have much in 
common. Additionally, of the components of meaning-in-life, happiness is the best and 
most comprehensively researched and measured. A common refrain is that “money 
cannot buy happiness.” While psychological research on the refrain’s underlying truth is 
contested and complex,162 there is significant evidence that having or acquiring things 
has a highly constrained ability to produce happiness.163 In the consumerist society of the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries, increasing material wealth has not brought a 
corresponding increase in happiness or meaning to life.164 First posited by Richard 
Easterlin in 1974, this confounding conclusion has become well known as the Easterlin 
paradox. In both Britain and the United States, happiness has declined over the last half-
century, while the economies in both nations have grown considerably.165 The Internet, 
ubiquitous smart phones, video games, limitless television and media accessible for 
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consumption, and the availability of cheap imported consumer goods have had no 
discernable impact on the average happiness across western society.  
The traditional explanation for the Easterlin paradox is centered around the 
relativity of impressions about personal conditions. As the material standards of a society 
improve, the judgments made of one’s position remain relative to the position of others, 
not to the absolute change.166 Money only contributes significantly to happiness in so far 
as one is wealthier than one’s neighbors.167 Colloquially known as the “keeping up with 
the Joneses” phenomena, it indicates that individuals judge and assess their material well-
being not in an objective sense, but rather against that of their immediate neighbors and 
their social networks.168 Across nations, the evidentiary link between material wealth and 
happiness is also mixed. Hedonic adaptation also portends that people will always rapidly 
regress to their mean happiness despite major improvements in standards of living and 
material wealth.169 The preponderance of the evidence suggests it remains as true today 
as when Durkheim noted over a century ago, that “nothing is more doubtful” than the 
happiness of the average individual increasing as humanity progresses.170  
D. MANUFACTURING MEANING 
Having established that meaning-in-life is both important and lacking in the 
modernity, it is necessary to explain the mechanisms through which it is manufactured. 
Experiences need not be violent or destructive to produce meaning. Activities as varied as 
quilting circles, parenting, extreme sports, high-stakes wall street trading, and enlistment 
in the military all serve to add meaning to lives. Psychotherapists have long noted the 
phenomenon of “Sonntagsneurose” whereby individuals whose meaning-in-life is 
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fulfilled largely through their work, experience feelings of discontent, anxiety, and 
depression on Sunday after a day without work.171 At its most fundamental level, 
meaning-in-life is a personal construction constituted of a unique and shifting set of 
internal and external factors. Viktor Frankl suggests that the search for meaning is not “a 
‘secondary rationalization’ of instinctual drives.”172 Humans have an internal drive 
Frankl describes as the “will to meaning” that is, above all else, the primary motivation in 
life.173 Importantly, meaning can only be created and fulfilled in the mind of an 
individual. External factors matter, but the creation of meaning is fundamentally 
individually constructed.  
In the Reker and Wong model, meaning creation exists in a pyramid with the 
most basic of human needs serving as the foundation and ultimate purpose forming the 
pinnacle (see Figure 2). Here, the production of meaning is both one of creation and 
discovery.174 Individuals can create meaning through their own actions and decisions, 
and they also discover meaning through reflection upon their greater position in society, 
its values, culture, and history. Each level in the pyramid contains its own properties and 
abilities.175 The foundational level of pleasure and comfort is essential, but it is also the 
least capable and least comprehensive of the sources of meaning. The top of the pyramid 
is formed by both service to others and to a cause greater to one’s self and to 
transcendence beyond the self. These sources, both created and discovered, produce the 
most profound and lasting meaning-in-life and contribute most significantly to global 
meaning. Importantly, this model has been demonstrated to hold empirical validity, as 
predicted by the foundational work of Viktor Frankl, whose ideas inspired its 
construction.176 Those individuals who reported sources of meaning through altruistic 
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service and self-transcendence, as opposed to lower sources, score significantly higher on 
measures of global meaning and life satisfaction.177  
 A Model of Meaning’s Sources178 Figure 2. 
 
 
Within the processes that create meaning, experiences are among both the most 
effective means of meaning formation and are those most under the control of an 
individual. Philosophers, theologians, and sociologists have long understood this 
phenomenon. From Petrarch’s “Ascent of Mont Ventoux” to George Simmel’s “The 
Adventurer,” the aesthetic encounter with adventure and its inherent power is a recurring 
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theme in literature and philosophy.179 Yet, the process of manufacturing meaning-in-life, 
and the unique ability of extraordinary experiences to do so, is not merely philosophical 
rhetoric. In contrast to the materialist theories of happiness, recent psychological research 
indicates that experiences produce a significantly higher return to happiness and life 
meaning that spending on material items.180 Even simply delaying gratification for 
experiences accrues more benefits to individual happiness than waiting for a consumer 
purchase.181 Given the choice, most people want to have experiences rather than have 
things.  
There a number of processes at work that enhance the effect of experiences over 
materialism for meaning. The testing of one’s self in uncertain and difficult situations 
stimulates physical and mental arousal and amplifies intrinsic enjoyment.182 
Csikszentmihalyi describes this experience as “flow” where the intersection of challenge 
and personal skills produces a situation where challenge, anxiety and stress are channeled 
such that they create intrinsic meaning and reward.183 The more natural or authentic the 
experience is perceived to be, the more the situation has the capability to produce reward 
and meaning.184 Gilovich and Kumar find that experiences provide enduring happiness 
and meaning by helping to build positive social relationships, limiting the possibility of 
encountering the “keeping up with the Joneses” phenomenon and most importantly, by 
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entering and strengthening meaning-in-life.185 Experiences can also be reflected upon 
later and are generally viewed upon more favorably as time passes.186 They have an 
impact not just to our internal construction of meaning, but to its social development as 
well. Having the opportunity to talk about experiences to others solidifies and reinforces 
the meaning of such experiences and enhances that meaning compared to other 
sources.187 Perhaps most critically, experiences are more central to our identity than 
possessions. In one study noted by Gilovich and Van Boven, given the choice between 
selecting a material item or an experience as a defining element in one’s life history, 89% 
of respondents selected an experience.188 Like Nozick’s “experience machine” suggests, 
people value authentic, lived experiences above all others, and far above material 
possessions. 
Importantly for the study of terrorism, young people tend to gain more happiness 
from extraordinary and uncommon experiences, but as people get older, they often gain 
more enjoyment from more ordinary experiences.189 Additionally, extraordinary and 
risky activities are more likely to attract young men than women.190 Bhattacharjee and 
Mogilner note that, “extraordinary experiences, which are rare and fall outside daily 
routines, capture people’s attention and endure in memories, affording happiness at any 
stage of life.”191 This suggests that not only are events uniquely capable of producing 
meaning as is suggested by the philosophical and aesthetic literature, but also that 
extraordinary experiences are the most likely to produce significant and lasting changes 
to an individual’s global meaning, particularly for young men.  
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This interaction of this process of meaning creation with modernity’s individual 
and societal influences is at its most visible in the growing industry of extreme sports. 
Situated within the global lacuna in meaning and stagnating happiness levels in 
modernity, there appears to be a steep rise in the interest and participation in sensation 
seeking behaviors, voluntary risk taking and extreme experiences.192 Among the most 
interesting trends in recent years has been the popularity of military-style obstacle course 
or Special Operations-themed endurance and adventure sporting events where middle-
class professionals, sometimes pay hundreds of dollars to escape their safe, routinized 
lives to race through a variety of difficult and dangerous obstacles modeled after war and 
military exercises.193 Sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have both observed 
that modern society appears to now organize itself most centrally to protect against risks 
in life.194 In this situation, risk sports (alternatively termed adventure or extreme sports) 
have increased rapidly in popularity.195 Unlike traditional team and individual sports 
common around the world, risk sports are generally practiced within highly industrialized 
societies.196 Indeed, like many terrorists, practitioners of risk sports largely come from 
the middle and professional classes.197  
Also like terrorism, the pursuit of adventure and extreme sports has been 
attempted and failed to be explained through the psychological pathology, or personality 
traits of individuals.198 More recent attempts at explaining the appeal of voluntary risk 
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have found a multi-part formulation to their appeal.199 At a basic level, risk sports 
function through biological processes, activating hormones and other biological 
mechanisms that produce positive emotions, and in turn, happiness.200 They also function 
at a societal level, situating individuals in a social hierarchy by demonstrating prowess 
and fortitude.201 Most importantly for our study, risk sports work at a cognitive level, 
producing meaning-in-life through unique experience, overcoming and transcending the 
self. In this aspect, participants are conducting what Stephen Lyng terms “edgework.” 
Edgework describes those voluntarily risky activities that take a person to the “edge” of 
life or death.202 Activities typical of edgework include skydiving, free climbing, 
motorcycle racing, or professions like aerobatic pilot or combat soldier.203 Lyng notes 
that when conducting edgework, participants “claim that the experience produces a sense 
of ‘self-realization,’ ‘self-actualization,’ or ‘self-determination.’”204 It also produces a 
uniquely strong emotional response where fear “gives way to exhilaration and 
omnipotence.”205 As Csikszentmihalyi notes, “people are happy not because of what they 
do, but because of how they do it.”206 Successfully navigating the line between risky 
thrill and death is a uniquely powerful cognitive experience that is difficult, if not 
impossible to imitate through other means. 
More fundamentally though, risk sports exist and flourish because of the 
condition of modernity and the changes it has foisted upon traditional sources of 
meaning. With the rational ordering of society to minimize risk, the routinization and 
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bureaucratization of industrialized and post-industrial society and the “liquid” nature of 
social structure, individuals have become unmoored from traditional sources of meaning-
in-life. Risk sports and “edgework” offer their practitioners the ability to escape the 
monotony and uncertainty of modern life for the risky certainty of the “experience of 
‘transcendence.’”207 This function, combined with the manner through meaning is 
constructed, offers insight into both the processes pulling individuals to terrorism who 
should not necessarily be predicted to do so by classical models, and the function of 
terrorism in their lives as they attempt to create meaning in a changing, liquid world.  
E. MEANING THROUGH TERRORISM 
If violence were the sole or even primary method to achieve meaning-in-life, it 
would be a much more present phenomenon. Yet, war and violence have a unique ability 
to produce extraordinary experiences and change people and the world around them. In 
many ways, war and armed struggle are the ultimate experience. At the core of both 
existentialist philosophy and positive psychology is the theory that meaning can and must 
be created by the individual for his or her own life through experience and action. Ernst 
Jünger, philosopher and veteran of combat in the trenches of World War One, wrote of 
battle as an “inner experience.”208 For Jünger, it is war that “has made people and their 
times what they are.”209 Reaffirming the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus views, 
Jünger writes that “war is the father of all things, including of us.”210  
Jünger rejects that notion that society should be rationally organized toward 
universal security, writing that “under such circumstances life would be intolerably 
boring.”211 Evoking the young “who, in the foggy dark of night, left their parental home 
to pursue danger in America, on the sea, or in the French Foreign Legion,” he suggests 
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that any “profitable life” will “depart for the distances symbolized by strange lands, 
intoxication or death.”212 In another work, Jünger too rejects the modern attempts to 
eliminate pain,213 finding suffering to be at the heart of the human condition.214 The true 
measure and meaning of life is one’s ability to withstand suffering and pain. Friedrich 
Nietzsche noted over 130 years ago that suffering can be its own reward and with it, 
meaning-in-life can form.215 The most moral man of the past was he who suffered the 
most in service to the group or family.216 For Nietzsche, no act proffered a person more 
gratification or feeling of power than the practice of cruelty.217 The desire of individuals 
to attain self-meaning in modernity is a uniquely strong motivator toward terrorism. 
Suffering, struggle, and self-overcoming through violence are the means through which 
terrorists achieve existential meaning in their lives. In this sense, terrorism and violence 
are the ultimate risk sports.  
As Lyng notes, “the same society that offers us so much in the way of material 
‘quality of life’ also propels many of us to the limits of our mortal existence in search of 
ourselves and our humanity.”218 More so than any other activity, terrorism produces an 
extraordinary experience, pushes the terrorist to the limits of risk and danger, attempts to 
serve a higher purpose, and produces meaning-in-life. Like skydiving, surfing, and other 
high risk activities, as Stranger put it in his discussion of the experience of surfing, 
terrorism involves an “experience of self-transcendence that is shared via the interaction 
of local participants and mediated through the global dissemination of images of the 
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sublime,” fulfilling both altruistic service to others and self-transcendence.219 In other 
words, terrorism transfers meaning as both a shared social experience and one that has 
permanence beyond the fleeting self—an ability almost no other activity can replicate.  
Having established the existence of the existential drive and its mechanisms, it is 
now critical to situate the implications of the existential model in the paths of actual 
individuals toward terrorism and the activities of the organizations they form. The 
following case studies will examine terrorists and terrorist organizations in historical 
context and illuminate how they might be better explained and understood through the 
existential model. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
From the rise of what we now think of as modern terrorism in the 1870s to the 
present, terrorism has neither been a consistent in intensity or ideological source. Not 
only has the magnitude of terrorism ebbed and flowed with global events, its ideological 
bases have shifted dramatically. What originated in modernity as atheist, anarchist 
terrorism has given way to a form that looks to a major world religion for its inspiration. 
Looking a back at the previous century of terrorist violence, David Rapoport proposes 
that terrorism is a phenomena that occurs in “waves”: cycles of activity that expand and 
contract, each composed of groups organized around similar principles or guiding 
“energy.”220 As the anarchists began the first wave of modern terror in Russia in the late-
19th century, other groups around the world emulated both their tactics and their 
underlying ideology. Across a human generation, the anarchist wave grew and 
contracted, only ending with the calamitous upheaval brought by the First World War. 
Out of the shadow of the World Wars arose a second wave, this time anti-colonial in 
inspiration and spanning the 1940s through the 1970s. The rise of international 
communism spawned the “new left” third wave of terror the end of which would only 
come with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Finally, the fourth wave, 
religious terrorism, began in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution and continues with no 
signs of abating.     
Some have criticized the wave theory of terrorism by suggesting that it is possible 
to trace each wave back further than Rapoport notes and by questioning the utility of its 
categorizations.221 However, there is significant empirical evidence for the wave theory’s 
fundamental assumptions about ideological coherence within a wave and conclusions 
about the dynamics of the waves themselves.222 Importantly, while the organizations 
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within the waves are largely local, the wave in which they exist is global, fostering co-
evolution across terrorist organizations and developing a common language, inspiration 
and character.223 Selecting a case from each of the waves offers diversity in the nature of 
the terrorism, its motivations, time and culture.  
Underlying the rational model is the assumption that terrorists maintain an 
objective function for the desired political payoff of their actions and evaluate the cost 
and benefits. This objective function serves to direct their activities in the most effective 
and instrumental fashion to achieve their goals. Terrorists hold ordered preferences about 
the political changes they seek to achieve; preferring one outcome more than another. A 
further imbedded assumption is that the benefits of any political changes generated by 
terrorist actions should accrue, at least in part, to the terrorists themselves. That is to say, 
in the rational model, individuals are be motivated to become terrorists and to action 
through grievances and deprivation and by the possibility of alleviating these grievances 
through political change. Finally, there is an expectation that failure as a terrorist or for a 
terrorist group has a penalty, both personally and collectively. Failed terrorists often end 
up in prison or dead, while failed terrorist movements can generate a backlash and wave 
of oppression that only enhances the grievances that spawned the group’s very 
existence.224 Though in many cases, the predictions of the rational model hold true, there 
are a startling number of terrorists and terrorist behaviors for which it offers little 
explanatory value. 
Finally, the rational model suggests that the actions by individual terrorists and 
the groups they form should reflect a strategic or instrumental approach toward the 
achievement of their ultimate goals. The rational model suggests that groups should 
pursue the most effective path to achieving their goals. Targets should be selected for 
their ability to harm the state or other adversaries and should be targeted with the most 
effective tactics that both harm the enemies, while preserving the strength of the group. 
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Yet, in group after group, leaders often personally involve themselves in attacks and 
utilize means that significantly risk their continued survival, even though superior 
alternatives exist. Even allowing for less-strict modified definitions of rationality leaves 
many common strategic decisions made by terror groups inexplicable. Instead, many 
terror organizations persist long after achieving many of their goals, or after failure is 
clear.225 A mismatch between the strategy and the tactics utilized by terror groups and 
individual terrorists and their stated goals could provide some insight into the less 
classically rational elements of their decision making, motivated more by the experience 
of doing terrorism rather than the desired outcomes. Where the rational model fails here, 
the existential model may be able to offer a supplement. 
To be sure, no individual terrorist or terrorist group is purely motivated by the 
existential drive. Even the most nihilistic or narcissistic terrorist receives some measure 
of motivation from the external world. The existential drive exists along a spectrum of 
importance from it being a predominant factor to of little importance. However, if present 
and functioning as theorized by this thesis, its influence should be found at varying levels 
across characteristics common to all terrorists. No matter how robust the case selection, 
the emergence and continued presence of the existential drive toward terrorism cannot be 
proven through even the most detailed case studies and process tracing through an ex post 
analysis of historical and current terrorists. Doing so will instead require careful 
psychological research, personal interviews of terrorists and potential recruits and 
investigation at both the individual and organizational level across time and place. 
However, historical case studies can help illuminate the historical evidence that supports 
the existence of the existential drive and how it has manifested in various ways in both 
individuals and in group dynamics. Each case study will illustrate the incongruence 
between the rational model and reality, suggest possible explanations through the 
existential model, and detail their implications in historical practice. More importantly, 
the potential individual manifestations of the existential drive toward terrorism and their 
implications are identified and examined in detail. Finally, these cases will offer guidance 
for future research into contemporary terrorist organizations and individuals.  
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A. THE RUSSIAN ANARCHISTS 
On April 4th 1866, the modern age of terrorism literally began with a bang. 
Dimitrii Karakozov, a young man of little remark, brandished a pistol, fired, and missed 
just as Tsar Alexander II emerged onto the street from the monarch’s St. Petersburg’s 
Summer Garden. When questioned by the Tsar himself about what he wanted from the 
assassination, Karakozov responded tersely, “Nothing.”226 In so doing, he became, 
arguably, the first modern terrorist,227 and perhaps the first existential terrorist whose 
motivations arose more from his internal struggles and search for self than the rational 
grievances he espoused.228 Failing in his assassination attempt, Karakozov was captured, 
leading to an investigation and trial that probed the depths of his mind and the events of 
his life leading up to the event. Though sentenced to death for his crime, he would inspire 
the protagonist Raskolnikov in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, and he would 
influence a generation of Russian artists, intellectuals, and radicals. Though 150 years 
stand between today and Karakozov’s attempted tsaricide, his case remains one of the 
best documented looks into the mindset and motivations of an individual terrorist.  
Karakozov’s path to terrorism is one of many contradictions that are impossible to 
retroactively reconcile. A sickly young man from a background of minor nobility who 
failed out of two law schools,229 he is easy to dismiss as an outlier or little significance in 
the wider study of terrorism for which we have so many other, perhaps more relevant 
cases. Marked in his time as deranged, sick, insane, and suicidal,230 he also developed a 
compelling case against the Tsar’s rule. He would also develop his own political strategy 
he termed “factual propaganda,”231 a primitive version of “propaganda of the deed,” a 
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concept that would not be formally introduced until 1877.232 Though there is no doubt 
that the Russian monarchy produced significant, and well justified grievances, Karakozov 
appears to have had little regard for the political consequences of his dramatic actions.233 
Karakozov took great care in selecting his clothing for the day of the attempted 
assassination, choosing them for their distinctiveness from his typical wardrobe, their 
plainness and their ability to serve as “urban camouflage.”234 He also carried a vial of 
prussic acid that would disfigure his face and obfuscate his identity. At the same time, 
Karakozov was clearly bored and devoid of purpose in his life, yet yearning for 
meaning.235 His actions that April 4th asserted a radical, new kind of freedom to sacrifice 
one’s self, take action and change the world. He stands as a unique individual, straddling 
the instrumental and the existential, and defining his path through self-sacrifice, struggle 
and action.  
The birth of modern terrorism in Russia is intimately intertwined with the onset of 
modernity—the economic, cultural, social, and political changes occurring in Russia and 
across the western world. The idea that a single individual, acting completely alone and 
of his own free will, could change the course of history was an idea with little precedent. 
Modernity and all of its trappings help to ensure that an act of terrorism has meaning and 
that it will become known around the world.236 Though it would take many years from 
Karakozov’s 1866 act for it to reach global awareness and impact, the ensuing anarchist 
wave of bombings and assassination would lead to the first global war against terrorism, 
not wholly unlike today’s war against Islamist terrorism.237 In fact, anarchism took much 
wider hold across social class and geography than today’s jihadist terror could ever hope 
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to reach. Anarchism counted 60,000 active adherents in Spain alone.238 The United 
States, France, Italy, Germany, and many other European states also saw thousands of 
their citizens joining anarchist movements and subscribing to anarchist publications.239 
Interestingly, anarchist violence around the world had almost no central direction or 
motivation.240 Instead, the wave of violence began and persisted as a spontaneous 
phenomenon divorced from any sense of a coherent movement or ideology.241  
In practice, assassination was the preferred tactic of anarchist terrorists across the 
first wave of terrorism.242 The year 1878 saw attempts on both the German Kaiser and 
Italian King and the already marked Tsar Alexander II was assassinated in 1881. The 
next decades saw no slowdown in violence, with frequent bombings across Europe and 
the United States and the assassinations of Empress Elizabeth of Austria, King Humbert 
of Italy and President William McKinley of the United States.243 In all, over 220 people 
died and more than 750 were injured in anarchist violence between the years 1878 and 
1914.244 The specter of anarchist violence was so great that it led to global changes in 
laws, the first international counter-terrorism conference and some of the first 
international cooperative policing and intelligence sharing efforts.245  
Often associated most closely with nihilism, the Russian anarchists, are in Claudia 
Verhoeven’s estimation, more accurately described as terrorists in search of their identity 
in a changing world—a direct reflection of modernity.246 Russian anarchism in particular 
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took on an almost religious character that emphasized sacrifice and salvation.247 Though 
most anarchists were avowed atheists, they adopted both the language of religion and its 
practices and adapted them for their own purposes and to fill the gap that could not be 
served by the Russian Orthodox Church.248 There is a significant link between violence 
and religious rituals as mechanisms of costly commitment and the development of social 
solidarity.249 For the individuals who were attracted to anarchist terrorism, they found the 
solidarity, ritual, and transcendence customarily offered by traditional religion through 
membership in the group and service to its common cause. 
The writings and communiques issued by anarchists would bear a stark 
resemblance to the sermons heard in church or those of the Christian Bible. One atheist 
anarchist, Ekaterina Breshkovskaia, extolled the transcendent virtues of battle and 
proclaimed that, “those of you who suffer or die in the struggle for justice and freedom 
will be called saints.”250 Others would appropriate apocalyptic language of the bible.251 
Indeed, the concept of the revolution and struggle and suffering in its cause would come 
to be the defining identity of the Russian anarchists.252 In one organization’s philosophy, 
“the act of killing must at the same time be an act of self-sacrifice.”253 Self-sacrifice and 
death were elevated to the highest of planes where all other identities were shed. Only 
then would terrorism have transcendent meaning. 
The case of Mariia Spiridonova illustrates the juxtaposition of identity, struggle 
and self-sacrifice common in the Russian anarchists. Born into an upper class background 
with a difficult, sickly adolescence, Spiridonova would become the most famous female 
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terrorist in Russia,254 where her “youth, beauty, chastity, and upper-class origin” 
uniquely made her a powerful symbol.255 Yet, it appears that like Karakozov, 
Siridonovoa had little interest in the political outcomes of actions.256 Instead, her turn to 
terrorism was more intertwined with the forces of modernity confronting Russia at the 
time than any grievances against the Tsarist regime. As Boniace finds, “had she not been 
living in a society wracked by the conflicting forces of modernization and autocracy, she 
might not have sought to subsume her private trauma in an underground struggle against 
the collectively inflicted injustices of the government.”257 Like so many others, 
Spiridonova would find radicalism, and through its struggles and travails, her identity 
too. 
The rise of anarchist terrorism in the 1870s and its persistence until the 1930s is 
no accident of history, but part and parcel of the changes undergoing the world at the 
time. Mass communication, advancing technology, and increasing global awareness made 
individuals aware of their potential for power while shifting their traditional sources of 
meaning and purpose.258 The anarchists were not merely lower class industrial workers 
or peasants, but middle and upper class intellectuals who were both politically and 
globally aware in a way dissimilar from any group before. From the earliest days of 
modern terrorism, the existential motive held powerful salience, altering the nature of an 
entire movement and shaping its course. Largely autonomous in nature, anarchist 
violence would be more about the “development of the individual,” than any instrumental 
outcome.259 Though the anarchist wave of terror would be extinguished by the changes in 
the wake of the First World War and Great Depression, it would foreshadow many of the 
features of the next three waves, and its lessons remain salient today.  
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B. THE BASQUE NATIONALISTS 
One of the most isolated cultural and linguistic groups in the world, the Basque 
nation has long existed as a region with a strong, stable cultural identity and history 
surrounded by shifting polities, cultures and borders. Basque Country, or as it is known in 
the Basque language, “Euskal Herria,” is nestled in the mountainous north-eastern corner 
of Spain and straddles across the border into France. Its people are thought to be the 
remnants of the original Paleolithic inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula, speaking a 
language, Euskadi, unrelated to any other extant in the world. For centuries, the Basque 
were known around the world as a seafaring people heavily involved in global trade. 
With the traders, the Basque diaspora spread widely across North and South America. 
Today, the Basque region holds significant autonomy from the Spanish government in 
Madrid and controls its own taxation, education, language policy and even has its own 
independent police force.260 Far from an oppressed, economically backwards backwoods, 
the Basque state is a center for manufacturing and technology and has a gross domestic 
product that significantly exceeds the average across Spain.261 Undeniably, the Basque 
state, like its fellow autonomous region Catalonia, has a privileged position among the 
constituent parts of the Spanish state and enjoys many benefits not available to the non-
autonomous regions. However, it has not always been so.  
As a unique ethno-linguistic group embedded as a minority in the Spanish state 
and with the fascist government led by military dictator Francisco Franco instituting a 
total ban on symbols of Basque nationalism, the basis for the formation of a separatist 
movement was already in place when the second wave of terrorism began to sweep the 
world in the wake of World War II.262 The first Basque nationalist groups gained their 
inspiration from the Cypriot and Irish rebellions as well as the Algerian insurgency 
against France.263 Basque identity and language was forced underground as the Francoist 
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government banned all symbols of Basque national identity as its fascist rule was 
increasingly threatened from all corners of the Spanish state.264 Observing the global 
wave of decolonization and separatism, the nascent nationalist-separatist groups were 
inspired by third-world nationalist movements to develop a political program that would 
lead to independence.265 Yet it would not be until the oppression of the Francoist 
government turned violent beginning in 1963, that the nationalist groups would be 
inspired toward violent insurrection.266 Oppressive laws and global conditions were not 
the only precipitating causes of the rise of Basque nationalism. Despite the strong 
position of the Basque region’s economy, taxation and industrial policy set in Madrid 
would have a disproportionately strong impact for Basque workers.267 Franco’s industrial 
policy would place the Basque province at the center of his poorly considered efforts, 
causing an influx of non-Basque migration to the region, increasing unemployment and 
causing political upheaval.268 Economic and political challenges would strain the Basque 
population and oppression would give legitimacy to the cause of nationalism, making the 
Basque region a fertile ground for the development of a separatist movement.   
An evolution of earlier Basque nationalist groups, the ETA (Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna [Basque Country and Freedom]) was formed in 1959 out of a breakaway 
group of the Basque nationalist political party in a dispute over tactics.269 Its original 
goals lay in the desire to seek independence for the seven provinces in Spain and France 
in which the Basques live and for the promotion of Basque linguistic and cultural 
identity. The ETA’s political vision took years to coalesce around central issues, with 
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disputes centered on tactics, strategy and desired political goals.270 The Basque language 
would come to define “Basqueness” and cooperation and collaboration outside the 
Basque nationality would come to be seen as undesirable and even treasonous, bounding 
the potential membership of the group. Across the final years of the fascist Franco 
government and the transition to democracy, the ETA managed to persist despite changes 
in the source of grievances and public support. 1979 and 1980 would see the passage of 
referenda on Basque autonomy, giving the region significant self-governing authority and 
ensuring the survival of the Basque language through a locally controlled education 
system.271 The ETA’s perseverance was not without contest and the group endured 
several splits over the use of violent means or legitimate political processes.272 Owing to 
the change in political environment, the ETA’s cause has since evolved. Most recently 
articulated in their 1995 communique entitled the “Democratic Alternative,” the later 
forms of the ETA sought a five point set of objectives centered upon the democratic 
rights of self-determination for the people of the Basque region.273 With their legitimacy 
largely stripped by the high level of autonomy now provided and tactical miscalculations 
harming the group’s profile, the ETA has largely ceased to exist as an active terrorist 
group, announcing an enduring ceasefire in 2011.  
Across its existence as the longest-lasting European terrorist organization,274 the 
ETA has been implicated in over 800 deaths.275 The ETA has been a particularly prolific 
terrorist organization, perpetrating an average of over 500 acts of terrorism per year from 
1987–2005.276 Uniquely, the ETA’s terrorism has largely occurred in the post-Franco era 
under democratic rule and in an environment of high autonomy and little state oppression 
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in the Basque region.277 In the last 20 years, the number of ETA terrorist acts resulting in 
deaths has decreased markedly.278 However, the volume of attacks remained high due to 
a tactical evolution where the ETA transitioned to specialized assassination and urban 
guerilla street fighting, known in Basque as “kale borroka.”279 If there is any group 
where the existential motive should be least likely to appear or drive terrorist decision 
making, it should be in an ostensibly ethno-linguistically homogenous nationalist-
separatist group motivated against a clear enemy and with a legitimate grievance. Yet, 
little about the ETA conforms to what should be predicted by the rational model of 
terrorism. There is much we can still learn from their history and trajectory.  
During the first generation of the ETA’s existence, its membership was comprised 
heavily of those not be likely to be the most enthusiastic about the Basque cause. Robert 
Clark’s 1983 study of ETA members and their backgrounds offers a number of 
interesting observations about the origins and motivations of the early core Basque 
terrorists. Collecting and analyzing 48 detailed cases, supplemented by data from Spanish 
prisons, Clark was able to outline the ETA’s demographics and ascertain patterns across 
the sample. Most of his results are unsurprising: the ETA is largely composed of young 
males with an average age of 24.280 Like most other terrorist groups, the ETA’s members 
and leadership were disproportionately university educated and from the middle and 
upper economic classes, though the ETA had a heavy representation from the working 
class as well.281 Almost no members of the ETA were drawn from those that were 
unemployed prior to joining, suggesting individual economic grievances were not strong 
motivators toward terrorism. In all, the ETA’s demographics are close to what should be 
expected for a terrorist organization.  
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More revealing is Clark’s examination of the role of ethnic identity in the 
motivation toward joining the ETA. In the highly homogenous Basque region, only 8% 
of all marriages were intra-ethnic between Spaniards and Basques. Despite this, Clark 
found that 40% of sampled ETA members came from intra-ethnic households.282 Perhaps 
even more surprisingly, 12% of ETA members had no Basque heritage at all.283 This 
suggests that a significant number of those that joined the ETA did so for reasons other 
than the rational choice grievances. Non-Basques and half-Basques should be less likely 
to join the ETA, not more. 
Importantly, almost all future ETA terrorists did not personally suffer from any 
personal grievance or have any harm caused against them by the Spanish government. 
Surprisingly, Clark could find only one person in this sample that personally suffered 
directly from the oppression of the Spanish government. Clark writes that 
only Inaki Orbeta (whose father spent four years in prison for his pro-
nationalist sentiments) and an anonymous etarra I interviewed in France 
in 1973 (whose father died in combat in the Spanish Civil War) could be 
said to be seeking revenge for something done to their fathers. In the great 
majority of cases, the oppression felt by etarras was experienced by 
Basques generally, and was not something peculiar to their specific 
families.284 
Clark also references the case of Andoni Bengoa, a half-Basque who “grew up in 
a family setting where Spanish was spoken, but where Basque nationalism was ardently 
espoused and was the topic of dinner table conversation on numerous occasions.”285 For 
others, such as that of Jose Luis Alvarez Enparantza “Txillardegui,” 
not only was the family not particularly self-conscious about its ethnicity, 
but the boy himself was not able to learn Basque until he was 17, and then 
it had to be done almost by himself, with little open encouragement or 
support. In a few cases, such as that of Jon Paredes Manot "Txiki," we see 
the son of two non-Basque parents completely reject his non- Basque 
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ancestry and even change his name (from the Spanish, Juan, to the Basque 
equivalent, Jon) to fit into a pro-Basque peer group.286 
Despite drawing a relatively narrow level of support from the Basque population, 
the ETA was able to recruit a significant number of individuals for whom the Basque 
cause should have had little salience. While the rational model of terrorism fails to 
explain the disproportionate draw of the ETA for those with limited or no personal 
grievances and of questionable “Basqueness” by the ETA’s own definition, the existential 
model offers an alternative explanation. Looking back at Clark’s study, Jerrold Post 
suggests that those with less than full Basque ancestry are attempting to “out Basque the 
Basques” and demonstrate their authenticity and prove their place within the Basque 
identity.287 The ETA represented a way to resolve internal contradictions in these 
individuals’ sense of coherence and sources of meaning. Stuck between two worlds and 
two identities, the half-Basques were disproportionately pulled to ETA to construct their 
own meaning-in-life through an authentic experience of social solidarity and self-
transcendence afforded by terrorism in the service of an identity-based cause.  
With joining the ETA so often motivated by the need for individuals lacking a 
firm identity to develop one, the ETA’s unique tactics and techniques offered ample 
opportunity for those individuals to do so through action and experience. Up to the 1990s, 
the targets of the ETA were by and large symbols of the coercive power of Spanish 
state—its police and military forces. Though many civilians were killed as the result of 
collateral damage in bombings, only civilian transgressors against the ETA and those 
who refused to pay its taxes were directly targeted.288 As the ETA lost public support and 
the history of legitimate grievances grew further in the past, it began a radicalization in its 
strategy to target more political and civilian targets to attempt to gain a renewed notoriety 
and inspire others to action.289 In its period of greatest activity and support from 1977 to 
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1992, only 2.6% of ETA targets were non-military or police officials of the Spanish state. 
As the ETA became more insular and changed its strategy, state officials and politicians 
rose to become 21.7% of targets—polarizing the population and deliberately “socializing 
the suffering” largely fictively felt by the ETA to the wider population.290 This would 
portend a significant change in the character of ETA violence and cause a substantial 
number of individuals opposed to the ETA to flee the region for their safety.291   
If it was the search for identity that drew young men to the ETA, then it would be 
street violence that would help them forge it. Known in the Basque Language as “kale 
borroka,” street violence took its place alongside assassination as the primary tactical 
practice of the ETA. In the two years approaching the 1992 Olympic Games held in 
Barcelona, street violence began a sharp rise that would eventually result in over 4,736 
acts attributed to the ETA from 1990 to 1999.292 Notably though, street violence in the 
Basque region rarely escalated to murder. Instead, the types of street violence ranged 
from arson against political party offices and the vehicles of politicians to the destruction 
of ATM machines and graffiti,293 and became largely inwardly directed against Basques 
who did not support ETA ideology and political goals.294 Street fighting in the ETA 
occurred almost exclusively in the Basque region, but would influence actions across the 
Spanish state and would be covered by international media.  
Kale borroka was not simply a form of petty criminal activity and vandalism that 
persisted without significant costs. Instead, ETA violence in the ‘90s and 2000s had 
wide-reaching economic and social effects. One assessment of the cost of ETA’s actions 
found that the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Basque region was depressed by 20% 
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due to terrorism.295 The volume of attacks caused an economic toll largely paid by the 
region’s taxpayers, with damage to public transportation alone exceeding 2.5 million 
Euros in one year.296  
The rhetoric surrounding street violence was heavily instrumental in nature, 
attempting to legitimate the use of violence in the service of the ETA cause.297 For the 
ETA’s leadership promoting the use of the tactics, kale borroka was not just street 
violence, but also a fundamental part of political struggle. It is clear that street fighting 
began as a deliberate strategy to “intensify” the salience of the ETA’s cause and to bring 
the Basque population closer to the ETA through a destabilization of the status quo that 
would force greater support for political change.298 It was also a strategy of propaganda 
of the deed that would bring the ETA’s cause to the forefront in the media after a long 
period of having been largely ignored by both local and national journalists.299 In De La 
Calle Robles’ appraisal, street violence’s guiding purpose was to punish and seek the 
compliance of non-radical Basques while keeping the cause of Basque nationalism highly 
visible in the public eye.300  
While street fighting had political direction from above, and some political 
purpose for those involved, it also had significant ritualistic elements. Radicalism became 
a way of life for many youth that enabled them to affirm their identity, prove their 
authenticity, and assert their freedom.301 Though developed as a deliberate strategy, 
street fighting often became disconnected from its original direction from above and took 
on a spontaneous quality. A report commissioned by the Basque government found that, 
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“these violent youths themselves are victims of the totalitarian strategy 
they serve.” The motives of juveniles resorting to violent action are being 
depoliticized: “many young people participate [in acts of violence] 
without any arguments nor political intention, even moved by a pitiful 
ludic conception of violence.”302 
Despite the suggestion common by Basque and Spanish authorities that the 
perpetrators of street violence had little awareness of the ETA cause and interest in its 
aims, many youth interviewed about their participation dispute the claim that they lacked 
political awareness.303 There are three traditional explanations found across ETA 
scholarship for the prevalence and persistence of kale borroka.304 First, some youth were 
drawn to street violence as an alternative to other forms of radicalism and rebellion 
against the mainstream of society.305 The second common explanation centers upon the 
ritualistic nature of the violence and its often spontaneous nature.306 The final 
explanation is the rational choice school, where street violence is a deliberate, controlled 
strategy managed by the leadership of the ETA that exploits vulnerable youth and directs 
them in the service of the organization’s cause.307 Undeniably, the selection of targets 
and distribution of violence perpetrated through street violence is anything but 
random.308 The level of polarization within a town for or against the ETA is the strongest 
predictor of the level of street violence, suggesting a strong rational element in the 
acts.309  
However, the existential and rational perspectives are not mutually exclusive. 
Public support declined significantly in the years following the end of the Franco 
dictatorship, and after significant tactical missteps leading to collateral damage eroded 
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the ETA’s reputation. The ETA needed to change both its tactics and strategy if it were to 
persist following the success of the referendums leading to Basque autonomy. There is 
significant evidence for the existential perspective that street violence was both 
extrinsically instrumental for the group and intrinsically instrumental for the individuals 
participating in it as a means though which meaning was created. Broek notes this duality 
in the ETA’s writings on the desired effect of a strategy of street violence where, “not 
only was political consciousness expected to motivate people’s participation in the 
struggle, but at the same time it was believed that a person’s direct implication in actions 
would boost his or her ideological maturity and lead to growing identification with the 
movement.”310 Research on ETA youth has also documented the Basque region’s 
remarkable lack of other radical elements like “skinheads” or “punk hooligans” common 
elsewhere in Spain.311 Basque youth already predisposed to extremism were subsumed 
into the ETA ranks. This suggests an inelastic supply of potential radicals from which to 
recruit and offers evidence for the unique power of violence and extraordinary experience 
to attract those seeking meaning-in-life as predicted by the existential model. Here, it is 
radicalism that has acquired an ETA character, pulling individuals to it, rather than a 
purely instrumental push to action. Fun, adventure and risk through kale borroka were the 
means through which youth would manufacture their meaning-in-life.312 Whether it was 
by design or simply chance is unclear, but without the ritualized and performative aspects 
of street fighting, the ETA would have been unlikely to attract nearly the same level of 
active support or maintain the volume of terrorism in the ‘90s. Existential attractions 
were indispensable.  
Though inspired and organized around clear, legitimate grievances, the ETA 
offers a strong case of the aesthetics of terrorism’s ability to motivate terrorists and direct 
the activities of an organization There does not appear to be a rational process that 
determined that street fighting was an effective way to draw young men to the ETA's 
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cause, rather it appears that it developed organically as a kind of contagion where it 
slowly attracted individuals who were predisposed to seeking radical activities to the 
ETA’s cause. Instead, street violence within Basque territory and often targeting co-
ethnic Basques became the organizing principle of the group. The Basque case illustrates 
that instrumental motives can and do co-exist with the existential, emergently changing 
the nature of a movement. The cause remained, but violence served twin purposes – one 
of inspiration, ritual, social solidarity and opportunity for extraordinary experience, and 
another toward the service of a political cause.  
C. THE EUROPEAN NEW LEFT 
Given the volume and level of media attention afforded terrorism since the 
September 11th 2001 attacks on America, one could be forgiven for assuming that current 
levels of terrorist attacks and foiled plots within Europe were unprecedented. However, 
the terrorism inflicted by the new left wave of terrorism in the 1970s through the early 
1990s remains significantly more intense and prolific that any terrorism seen in Europe 
since.313 Among the most prolific and high-profile of the new left terrorist organizations 
in Europe, the Rote Armee Fraktion [Red Army Faction (RAF)], commonly known as the 
Baader-Meinhof Gang after the last names of two of its founders, remains one of the 
more unique and well-studied groups of the era.314  
The RAF’s continued prominence in both terrorism scholarship and in the popular 
imagination can largely be linked to the public notoriety and personae of its founding 
leadership. The original core of the RAF was formed by four individuals of strikingly 
different backgrounds: Horst Mahler, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike 
Meinhof. Of the original core, it was Ulrike Meinhof who had the longest history with 
leftist politics and the most contact with other radicals. As a respected journalist for the 
well-read leftist publication “Konkret,” Meinhof had long adopted a leftist worldview and 
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held strong, considered views on political and social questions.315 Though Meinhof was 
often the public face of the RAF and remains its most studied member, Gudrun Ensslin is 
considered, in retrospect, to be the strategic leader of the RAF. Ensslin was born into a 
religious family where her father served as the pastor of a local evangelical church.316 
Growing up by all accounts with a happy childhood, she would perform well at school 
and would later study at the University of Tübingen, one of West Germany’s top 
colleges.317 Her turn to radicalism came via her sister’s marriage to a Marxist poet, but 
she would not turn violent until her partnership with Andreas Baader beginning in 
1967.318 The other core members had less history with the intellectual and political forms 
of radicalism. Horst Mahler and Andreas Baader are both better described as “bad boys” 
and common criminals than ideologues. Horst Mahler would later be rejected by the 
RAF, drastically change his ideological outlook, and join the National Democratic Party, 
the successor to the Nazi Party where he remains active today despite serving a twelve-
year prison sentence for Holocaust denial.  
Though the early members had long been associated and active together, as a 
formal organization, the RAF was formed on 14 May 1970 as a part of the wave of global 
instability and largely out of anti-Vietnam and anti-imperialist sentiment. The 
precipitating event for the radicalization of the core members of the RAF was the death 
of Benno Ohnesorg at the hands of the West German police during a protest against the 
Shah of Iran.319 His death would be a radicalizing factor for a number of groups and 
would even serve as the basis for the name for the June 2nd movement. In the days 
between the RAF’s founding on 14 May 1970 and the group’s announcement of their 
disbanding on 20 April 1998, they were responsible for 34 deaths and over 230 injuries 
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through their actions.320 Across the three decades of RAF activity, they caused damage 
greater than $500 million Deutschmarks (DM), and were implicated in the theft of $7 
million DM across 31 bank robberies.321 In that same time, thousands joined and left the 
RAF across its three distinct generations, with German courts convicting 517 individuals 
for membership in a terrorist organization and another 917 for material support.322 
Though the RAF’s volume of attacks, damage and death toll was exceeded by their 
fellow German terrorist group the Revolutionäre Zellen [Revolutionary Cells] and the 
Italian Brigate Rosse [Red Brigade] across the same time period of existence, the RAF 
uniquely retains a central place in the cultural history of Germany during the Cold War 
and in the minds of Germans today.323     
Not unlike the other left-wing terrorist organizations of the time, the RAF was 
constituted of members with high educational achievement. Of the known members, 39% 
had a university-level education, significantly higher than the average for Germans at the 
time.324 Humanities, the law and the social sciences dominated the fields of study of the 
RAF.325 Many of the RAF’s members across all generations had successful careers 
before their move underground, and many had families and children. Unique among 
almost all historical terrorist groups, the RAF achieved near gender-parity in its 
membership.326 Women were not merely members or companions to the men in the 
RAF. Instead, they held the highest leadership roles and guided the decision making of 
the group.327 As a whole, they were from the middle and upper classes of German society 
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and had little personal experience with oppression or deprivation. These were not 
impoverished outcasts, but people with high social status and seemingly much for which 
to live. 
Strategically, the decisions made and the means utilized by the RAF in the service 
of terrorism defy easy explanation by the rational model. While most terrorist 
organizations begin around a small group of activists, typically they evolve to organize in 
a classic division of labor where group leadership offers strategic guidance and material 
support to foot soldiers who then carryout the attacks.328 In contrast, the RAF’s first 
generation leadership maintained a highly personal role in all of its activities. 
Additionally, despite substantial means, including some level of foreign sponsorship and 
their operation in an open, democratic society, the RAF pursued a strategy focused upon 
assassination through largely personalized direct action tactics. Ulrike Meinhof herself 
participated in direct action terrorist actions, directly resulting in the death of civilians in 
the May 1972 bombing campaign,329 and even led a bank robbery in 1972.330 The other 
founders would be no less involved in active terrorism: setting fires, planting bombs, 
robbing banks, and assisting in a jailbreak.331  
Terrorism is already a costly exercise when compared to other methods of seeking 
political change.332 Rationally, individuals and groups should not seek to increase its 
costs by utilizing sub-optimal, unnecessarily risky tactics. Just one year into the group’s 
existence, fourteen of its members were either dead, in hiding, or in prison, leaving only 
eight active members remaining.333 Later generations would fare no better. Despite never 
counting more than 30 core members and 200 active supporters at any one time during 
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the RAF's three generations,334 more than 1,400 were arrested and convicted for their 
involvement.335 This suggests that the RAF practiced uniquely poor operational security 
measures and had little regard for the typically important techniques of group survival 
used by most terrorist organizations.  
The RAF also formed alliances with groups whose motivations and professed 
goals were antithetical or at the very least incompatible with the ideologies of the RAF. 
In June 1970, twenty-four RAF members traveled together to the Levant where they 
would train with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO, skeptical of 
the RAF’s motives and abilities, arranged a schedule that was more “revolutionary 
tourism” than practical military training.336 Demands for mixed-sex accommodations and 
the low quality of food would immediately place the RAF visitors at odds with their 
conservative PLO hosts.337 Though some took the training seriously, others treated it like 
a vacation, sunbathing naked and preferring to play the part of “urban guerilla” without 
actually preparing for its requirements. Ultimately and unsurprisingly, irreconcilable 
cultural and strategic differences would lead to the PLO tiring of the RAF visitors and 
cancelling their training.338 Despite the outcome of the training camp visit and their 
fundamental differences, an uneasy and curious relationship with the PLO and other 
Middle Eastern terrorist organization would continue across the early years of the RAF’s 
existence. PLO terrorists would even join with the RAF to hijack a Lufthansa flight in 
1977 in a last ditch effort to free Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader and Jan-Carl Raspe 
from prison. The successful raid and freeing of the hostages by the German counterterror 
police unit Grenzschutzgruppe 9 der Bundespolizei (or GSG9) in Mogadishu, Somalia 
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would be the precipitating event for the suicides of the remaining RAF core members in 
the Stammheim prison. 
For all the discontinuity between the actions, words and strategy of the RAF with 
the rational model’s predictions, the existential model offers an alternative that may 
better explain their behavior. One explanation for the tactical decisions of the RAF might 
be the influence of Carlos Marighella’s Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla that heavily 
informed the writing of the RAF’s Urban Guerilla Concept.339 Marighella’s manual 
emphasizes direct action and the use of personal arms over other tactics. The mini-
manual details not only the common tactics of assaults, raids, ambushes, kidnapping, 
assassination and other means of terrorism adopted by the RAF, but also the role of 
ideology and popular support in achieving instrumental political change. The RAF appear 
to have internalized the tactics and techniques of the mini-manual throughout the group, 
utilizing “urban guerilla” style tactics almost exclusively throughout the group’s 28 years 
of existence. 
In the case of the RAF and of Marighella’s mini-manual, the instrumental and 
existential perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is significant 
evidence for existential motives in the actions the RAF, other leftist German terrorist 
organizations and their members. Marighella’s “urban guerrilla” is not simply an actor or 
a cog in a machine. To be an “urban guerilla” is an identity and a way of life, not just a 
set of tactics and techniques. The mini-manual emphasize the aesthetic and personal 
qualities of the urban guerilla as much as the technical and tactical aspects. For him, the 
central reason for the urban guerilla’s “existence” was his or her “shot.”340 Also for 
Marighella, it took the direct participation of the leaders of terrorist movements to truly 
catalyze change and inspire others.  
Being a terrorist in the RAF was about performance as much, or even more, than 
it was ideology. In a nod to the importance of the performative nature of their actions, the 
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group would even restyle itself 1972 as an “avant-garde” movement, rather than a simple 
resistance movement.341 The RAF’s focus following the capture of the early core leaders 
demonstrates an unusual transition from an external enemy to an organization inwardly 
concentrated on self-preservation. From 1973–1977, nearly all of the energy of the RAF 
was oriented on freeing imprisoned members of its group.342 The second and third 
generations would become even more violent and less ideological.343 Though the first 
generation of the RAF was involved with some killing, it would be the second generation 
that would bring assassination and wider violence to the RAF’s repertoire. For these new 
members, their actions were as much about the goal of springing the imprisoned founders 
from jail as it was about impressing others in the movement and the performance of being 
RAF terrorists.344 In the rational model, this approach fits poorly with what should be 
predicted. However, in the existential model, it is easily understandable.  
It is not just the actions of the RAF that suggest existentialist motives, their own 
words portray individuals who not only utilize terrorist actions for instrumental purposes, 
but also place terrorism and the practice of terrorism at the core of their identity and use it 
to construct meaning in their lives. Existentialist language runs through the writings of 
the core leadership of the RAF from the very beginning of the group’s association. In an 
act of stark strategic miscalculation that would lead to their jailing for arson, Andreas 
Baader and Gudrun Ensslin set fire to a department store. Though Baader would 
retroactively boast of the arson’s anti-Vietnam war motives, Gudrun Ensslin spoke of the 
act as a way “to set herself free.”345 Baader would also suggest that the arson was a way 
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to “celebrate their marriage.”346 From the beginning, terrorism was about the act as much 
as it was the message. 
For the core members of the RAF, fighting became their primary identity—their 
source of meaning-in-life. From prison in October 1974, Ulrike Meinhof wrote “if 
fighting is your identity…we can’t be oppressed, as long as we don’t stop thinking and 
fighting.”347 For Meinhof, ideology became less important than action, writing that “the 
battle…is precisely not about being right—never—but about doing what one does, wants 
to do, has to do in the right way.”348 Gudrun Ensslin adopts similar language in her 
writings remarking that the suffering was the highest form of being and that “there can be 
no greater certainty, than the certainty of our experience.”349 Even the crude, unschooled 
Andreas Baader espoused existential motives in his actions, having told his associates in 
the RAF of his desire to achieve immortality through his actions.350 Remarkably, the 
most famous existentialist of the time, Jean-Paul Sartre, even visited Andreas Baader in 
Stammheim prison in 1976, a trip he for which he would later express regret.351 In 
prison, the founders of the RAF and Meinhof in particular would undergo a further 
transformation of identity to that of struggling victims.352 Holger Meins sought 
martyrdom in his 1972 Stammheim prison hunger strike where he took on the identity of 
a Nazi concentration camp victim, dressing in a white silk gown and “sacrificing himself 
for the fight against injustice.”353 Ulrike Meinhof would also adopt the Holocaust 
narrative, juxtaposing their treatment in jail against that of the Jewish victims of the Nazi 
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“final solution.”354 When the ability to hold that identity was finally lost after the failure 
of the joint RAF-PLO hijacking plot designed to ransom them from prison, Baader, 
Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe would commit suicide the very next day. For each of the core 
members of the RAF, their only assertion of their self, identity, and by extension, their 
meaning-in-life, was achieved in “self-sacrifice.”355   
Existentialist language and motivations in German new-left terrorism are not 
limited just to the Red Army Faction. They also sit at the core of the writings of the 
German left-wing terrorist, and founder of the Movement 2 June, a group affiliated with 
the RAF,356 Michael “Bommi” Baumann. In his memoir Terror or Love?, Baumanm 
describes his transformation from a young working class apprentice to “urban guerilla.” 
Unlike the well-educated and philosophically aware Ulrike Meinhof,357 he never 
encountered the writings of Sartre, Camus or any other existentialist in his youth. Yet, he 
finds himself growing up without purpose in a cold, industrial Berlin suburb and slowly 
encounters others like himself, as well as the writings of Sartre. Cottee and Hayward also 
find Baumann to be motivated by existential desires, observing that in the first chapter of 
his memoir “Baumann is seized by the impulse to run.”358 Baumann writes that,  
on the ride to the construction site, it suddenly hit me: you’re gonna be 
doing this for fifty years, there’s no escaping it. The scare of that just stuck 
in my bones. I had to look for ways to get out.359  
Unable to find meaning in his life as a construction worker, finding it devoid of 
the authentic craftsmanship that fulfilled his master craftsman mentor, Baumann is drawn 
to find something else.360 Writing floridly about the experience of terror, Baumann 
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explains how he overcame his “fear of freedom” and took action to set the path of his 
own life.361 Page after page, he describes the “energy” and “high” of being an “urban 
guerilla.”362 Baumann’s own words suggest that he is not pushed to join the “Movement 
2 June”, through a process of identifying grievances and a desire to achieve a political 
change as would be predicted by the rational model. Rather, it is clear that the draw of 
terrorism and the experience of being a terrorist pulled him though the possibility of 
excitement, fun and transcendence divorced from their effect as suggested by the 
existential model.  
Operating in a western, open democracy with foreign sponsorship, motivated by a 
powerful ideology and holding significant public support, the Red Army Faction was in a 
strong position to both conduct a significant number of effective terrorist actions against 
the German state and its American supporters and to achieve significant political change 
from these attacks.363 It is also clear that leftist ideology and desire for political change 
were important to the members of the RAF. Yet, the RAF completely failed in achieving 
its objectives. Additionally, there are significant incongruences between the RAF’s 
ideology and strategy and their manifestations through the actions of the RAF. The 
rational model poorly explains why the RAF pursued the paths it did. However, if the 
RAF and its activities are viewed through an existential lens, their actions become more 
explicable. When the practice of being a terrorist is more important than achieving any 
particular outcome, an inward focus and sub-optimal tactics make more sense. For some, 
seeking the experience of terrorism and its uniquely transformational abilities overrules 
any rational, strategic calculations. 
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D. THE ISLAMIC STATE 
On August 19th 2014, a video released on the Internet depicted a young American 
man dressed in an orange jumpsuit and kneeling next to a masked man dressed in black 
brandishing a large knife. The man, identified as captured journalist James Foley, recites 
a prepared speech outlining the grievances of his captors and casting blame upon the 
United States for the forthcoming act. The executioner then uses the knife in an edited 
sequence to behead James Foley. This video is not unique. Rather, it is but one of dozens 
of such videos produced and disseminated by the Islamic State since its rise to 
prominence in 2013. Like other IS-produced visual media, the execution videos have a 
powerful aesthetic quality, juxtaposing the practice of extreme, primitive cruelty against 
slick, modern production values and the power of the internet to reach diverse global 
audiences. Unique among modern terrorist organizations, the Islamic State has made 
brutality and cruelty its trademark practice.364 Despite the plain cruelty and barbarism 
displayed in the video of James Foley’s beheading, the executioner was not some 
uneducated religious zealot, unexposed to the world or to western, liberal values. Instead, 
the executioner seen in the video speaks with a British accent and was quickly given the 
moniker “Jihadi John” by western journalists. Intelligence agencies later identified 
“Jihadi John” as Mohammed Emwazi, a Kuwati born Arab who moved to the United 
Kingdom at the age of six. By all accounts, he had a normal childhood, replete with 
friends and the typical insecurities of youth.365 Emwazi received a quality education, 
graduating from a good British public school and matriculating to the University of 
Westminster, where he would later earn a degree in Computer Science.366 Certainly, the 
social-networks in which Emwazi would become entangled would play a role. Yet, they 
cannot alone explain how a seemingly average British immigrant could suddenly become 
the face of savagery for one of the world’s most brutal terrorist organizations.    
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The Islamic State as we know it today is not a purely new group. Its roots draw 
back deep to the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s. More directly, the Islamic State is a 
byproduct of the 2003 Iraq War and a direct descendant of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
branch founded by the late Mohammed Al-Zarqawi.367 Despite its long roots, the Islamic 
State has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from earlier iterations and other 
groups of similar ideological composition and strategic objectives. Perhaps its greatest 
value as a case study comes from its unique ability to draw large numbers of foreign 
fighters from around the world. Not since the mujahedeen of the 1979–1989 Soviet-
Afghan war has the world seen such high levels of foreign fighters flocking to a conflict 
and no group of foreign volunteers has drawn from such a diverse background since the 
Spanish Civil War. Estimates for the number of foreign fighters who have traveled to 
Syria since 2011 range from 10,000 to 16,000, with as many as 3,400 of those coming 
from the Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States.368 
Like that of the ETA and the RAF, the demographics of the Islamic State are not 
what should be predicted by the rational model. At the macroscopic level, economic 
deprivation and poverty are not correlated with participation in ISIS by foreign fighters. 
In fact, the opposite is true. The number of ISIS foreign fighters correlates positively with 
GDP per capita and with their ranking in the World Bank’s more holistic Human 
Development Index (HDI).369 Political characteristics, as measured by the Freedom 
House’s index of “Political Rights” also have no correlation to the volume of foreign 
fighter flow from a particular country.370 German demographic and immigration numbers 
and trends also have little correlation with the foreign fighter flow. A 2014 study by the 
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German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz) of Germans traveling to fight in Syria found that 61% of German 
foreign fighters were born in Germany and 37% held only German citizenship.371 The 
majority of European foreign fighters are second generation immigrants born in Europe 
with the next largest group being converts.372 Even though other studies have found a 
strong positive connection between Muslim immigrants obtaining citizenship and 
integration, holding German Citizenship does not decrease the likelihood that individuals 
would travel to Syria.373 This pattern repeats across Europe where foreign fighters are 
leaving even the most comfortable lives in generous Scandinavian welfare states for the 
struggle and suffering inevitable in the Islamic State’s nascent “caliphate” under siege by 
the United States, Russia, the Syrian government, and even fellow jihadi terrorist 
organizations.  
As Daniel Byman notes, the ideological endstate of the Islamic State is highly 
instrumental: the (re)establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East.374 Yet, 
despite the instrumental nature of the IS' strategy, its foreign adherents and supporters 
stand to benefit little from its success. At the organizational level, the Islamic State 
appears to implicitly understand the existential attractions of terrorism and is using them 
to recruit and attract adherents from around the world. At another level, the attraction of 
the Islamic State is an emergent phenomenon where the imagery and mythology 
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promoted by the “caliphate” is inspiring a desire for the experience of being there and 
being a part of the group. Petter Nesser also identifies a class of jihadi in Europe 
composed of those he terms the “drifter.”375 Drifters come to terrorism without specific 
reasons and motivations and seek social rewards, rather than political change from their 
involvement in political violence. In different times and circumstances, drifters may have 
been attracted to an alternative phenomenon like communism or anarchism. Today, it is 
Islamist terror, by virtue of its prominence which gains their attention in a search for 
identity and meaning.376 
Olivier Roy has recently noted evidence for similar phenomena within recent 
Islamist terrorism in Europe and among Europeans serving as foreign fighters in Syria 
and Iraq. In Roy’s estimation, it is not that some parts of Islam have become radical, as is 
commonly assumed, rather it is radicalism itself that has taken on an Islamic character in 
the fourth wave of terrorism.377 Few traveling to Syria have more than the most basic of 
understandings of Islamic theology and the Koran.378 A close study of the backgrounds 
of fourteen German foreign fighters found that only two were motivated by group 
grievances against themselves, or their real or fictive kin.379 Instead, the most common 
factor among the studied terrorists was a dislocating event that threatened their identity, 
meaning-in-life, and place within their social networks.380 They turned to radicalism to 
fill the newly formed gap in meaning and actively affirm an identity. 
 Though of starkly different backgrounds, white Canadian convert Andre Poulin 
and the French-born son of Moroccan immigrants Brahim Abdelsalem both illustrate the 
phenomenon described by Olivier Roy well. In earlier years, each may have become 
anarchists or leftists. Each singularly lacked even the shallowest connection to the cause 
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of the Islamic State, or even more than a basic knowledge of the Islamic faith and its 
teachings. Running a bar connected to drug trafficking and previously arrested for low-
level burglary, Abdelsalem went from living a life nearly perfectly antithetical to that 
espoused at the proper path by either the Koran or the radical ideology of the Islamic 
State to becoming a suicide bomber in the service of the cause of the Islamic State.381  
Standing in sharp contrast to Abdelsalem, Andre Poulin was a white convert to 
Islam that traveled to Syria in 2012 to join the cause of the Islamic State.382 Killed in 
combat in 2013, Poulin would later be featured in a slick recruiting video replete with 
footage of Canada where he described his path to joining ISIS. Describing his life back in 
Canada as having been good and rejecting being typecast as a social outcast by noting 
that he had friends and money, Poulin extolled the virtues of traveling to Syria to 
westerners.383 Though it goes largely unmentioned in the video, Poulin’s background is 
not as clean as he would suggest. Before turning to Islam, he had brushes with 
communism and anarchism and spent time in jail for threatening another man with a box 
cutter. Yet, he is little different than thousands of other young Canadian men who did not 
travel to fight for ISIS in Syria.  
Neither outcasts, nor a people with a settled identity, Abdelsalem, Roy, and others 
like them are self-seekers, inspired by the ideas and the actions of the group.384 As Roy 
terms them, they are “rebels without a cause” who are primed to find one and then to be 
instrumentalized by a terrorist organization toward its goals.385 Lacking a strong 
connection to the central strategic aim of the Islamic State, a legitimate personal 
grievance or even an articulated goal or end state, Poulin and Abdelsalem’s actions are 
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more about the means than the end. The Islamic State offers them a path to the enduring 
and profound and it presents the means for producing meaning in the most durable and 
exceptional manner. Struggle and violence have a power of their own, disconnected from 
any changes they may cause. 
The practice of viewing “unrefined” or “cruel” practices of warfare as barbarous, 
savage, and lacking value and purpose has a long tradition in the West dating to the times 
of the Greeks and Herodotus.386 Yet, brutality for the Islamic State has an instrumental 
purpose and undeniable strategic value. Groups use beheadings, assassinations and other 
such practices as costly signals to build group loyalty and identify the most committed of 
adherents. Much like poorly written and implausible Nigerian e-mail scams help screen 
out all but the most gullible,387 the brutal practices, imagery and reputation cultivated and 
broadcasted by the Islamic State help to recruit only those who are most likely to be 
committed and fanatical in the service of their cause. Beheadings in particular have been 
used by a number of Islamist terror groups for a variety of other strategic objectives 
including provocation, revenge, financing, evoking fear and demonstrating group 
commitment.388 It also serves the purposes of the “cosmic war” being waged by IS, 
galvanizing its own fighters and setting a dramatic contrast between themselves and their 
sectarian adversaries.389   
Beyond the rational objective of the practice of cruelty, is its aesthetic appeal and 
emotional experience. Islamic state recruitment and propaganda materials reveal a deep 
sense of their grasp of the existential attractions of terrorism. It is no accident that the 
propaganda of the Islamic State is produced at such a high quality and aimed at Western 
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audiences.390 The pictures of cruelty and brutality so vividly transmitted around the 
world via the internet has both purpose and effect. The religious imagery of the 
propaganda is in part a ritualistic reenactment of the “cosmic war” declared by IS.391 
This too is instrumental in a sense, but focused on shifting factors internal to the 
individual. The slick production values offer a small taste of the experience of being 
there and entice the young and alienated to join and gain the authentic experience of 
doing. Being there produces what Durkheim called, collective effervescence, a force that 
makes individuals feel bigger and more powerful than ever before.392 For Durkheim, this 
was the source of the “sacred” in every religion and held a uniquely transformative and 
renewing quality.393 The Islamic State’s rise has also seen the introduction of a particular 
popular aesthetic that has come to be known as “Jihadi cool.” In one sense, “Jihadi cool” 
is a way of combining western popular culture with the ideology of jihad and a sense of 
adventure to forge a new identity and settle one’s self within a social hierarchy.394 In 
another, it is a deliberate construction of the Islamic State and other Islamist groups to 
prey upon celebrity-obsessed western youth to demonstrate how they too can become 
famous and celebrated.395 The Islamic State, both organically and as a part of a deliberate 
strategy as Abu Bakr Naji’s influential manuscript “The Management of Savagery” 
makes clear, has mastered the manipulation of the existential qualities of both being a 
jihadi and doing jihad.396  
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Writing one-hundred and thirty years ago, Friedrich Nietzsche knew the power of 
cruelty and brutality as “one of the oldest joys of mankind,” where it held a unique ability 
to stir human passions and reach the “highest gratification of the feeling of power.”397 
Nietzsche also wrote of the power of ritual and tradition where “any custom is better than 
no custom.”398 These twin powers, largely forgotten in the West, and downplayed in the 
rational model of terrorism, have conspired to pull thousands of young men and women 
from comfortable, modern lives to the atavistic world of the Islamic State. Here, the 
experience of being a terrorist is first and foremost a way of becoming someone, rather 
than achieving something for others. Characters as different as Mohammed Emwazi, 
Brahim Abdelsalem, and Andre Poulin each came to the Islamic State searching for 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In one of the few acknowledgements of the existential drive’s role in terrorism, 
Jerrold Post astutely notes that “terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from 
being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their 
very reason for being.”399 It certainly cannot be denied that grievances, deprivation, 
sacred values, and oppression are each key drivers of terrorism. Yet, none, either 
individually or together are necessary or sufficient causes to explain the path to terrorism. 
In many circumstances, the causal path toward terrorism will be clear. A clear grievance, 
aligns with ideology and a radicalizing event to lead an individual to a “crime of reason.” 
Still, in many other circumstances, terrorism appears to have been done for its own sake, 
divorced from any rational, instrumental goal—a true “crime of passion.” Most often, 
terrorism is both a crime of reason and of passion. Yet, the undeniable role of passionate, 
existential motivations in terrorism has long been under-studied, if not totally ignored.  
Camus’ crimes of passion matter in terrorism. Understanding the importance of 
meaning-in-life is not simply an exercise in academic philosophy. Instead, we know it is 
central to health human development and psychological wellbeing. Having value in one’s 
existence, purpose-in-life, a sense of control and positive self-worth is essential for 
meaning-in-life.400 In the absence of any one of these factors, individuals seek to 
construct their own meaning-in-life and find extraordinary experiences the most effective 
means of doing so. From this, it is clear that the experience of being a terrorist and a 
practitioner of violence is as important as the justifications and ostensible motivations 
behind the acts. The recent terrorist attack in San Bernardino that killed fourteen people 
was perpetrated by educated, middle class individuals with only fictive personal 
grievances and no clear motive.401 Despite pledging allegiance to the cause of the Islamic 
State and holding substantial means of violence, the shooters Syed Rizwan Farook, and 
                                                 
399 Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” 38. 
400 Baumeister, Meanings of Life, 29. 
401 Michael S. Schmidt et al., “San Bernardino Suspects Left Trail of Clues, but No Clear Motive,” 
The New York Times, December 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/san-bernardino-
shooting.html. 
 86 
his wife Tashfeen Malik, selected a marginal objective of no significant external 
importance in a region full of soft, high profile targets.402 Instead of attacking the 
instruments of the state currently threatening their associated terrorist organization, Syed 
Farook selected his own office holiday party as the first target. This suggests that their 
motivation, even if inspired by the Islamic State, arose from factors internal to their mind, 
their identity, and the way in which they constructed meaning-in-life. If true, there is little 
to nothing that current national or local policy or programs could have done to dissuade 
them and others like them from pursuing terrorism.  
Counter-violent extremism programs, particularly in Western democracies, 
operate on a set of common premises that are empirically weak, and based on a flawed 
ethnocentric, secular, liberal view of humanity where all actions must have instrumental 
and rational antecedents.403 The strong presence in the Islamic State and other Islamic 
terrorist groups of educated, prosperous individuals from loving homes and comfortable 
upbringings with little religious education or piety belies the notion that educational, 
religious, and counter-messaging efforts will have a significant impact on the flow of 
western foreign fighters. The same is true of other historical terrorist organizations from 
the Russian anarchists to today. Terrorism is as often the province of the rich and 
privileged as it is the poor and oppressed. The Basque case suggests that if even if all 
grievances and oppression were somehow alleviated, terrorism would not simply cease to 
be an issue. Violence, suffering and struggle still have a unique ability to produce 
transcendent meaning not yet replicable by other sources.  
Developing a full understanding of both the role of meaning-in-life and the 
existential will to meaning, along with their respective functions in terrorists, requires 
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significant additional research.  Though we know that meaning is of critical importance 
for both physical and psychological well-being, we know little of its change over time 
and of its presence and difference across countries and regions. To truly understand the 
influence of a theorized decline in meaning in modernity on terrorism’s appeal, form and 
volume, greater cross-cultural and time-sectional analysis of the indicators of meaning 
and purpose in life are needed. At a microscopic level, terrorism scholars must take the 
role of meaning-in-life seriously as they consider the drivers of terrorism for individual 
terrorists. Interviews and psychological profiles of returned and captured foreign fighters 
should include measures of personal meaning and utilize tools such as the Personal 
Meaning Profile or others to locate predictors of predisposition toward terrorism. Such 
tools should also be applied more widely to identify vulnerable populations and develop 
alternative CVE programs that might better address existential motivations along with 
traditional levers.  
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the existential model is its inability, like all other 
models of individual radicalization toward terrorism, to explain the extreme equifinality 
in the process. It remains impossible to predict why one individual becomes a terrorist 
while another does not, even if they share nearly all the same demographic and 
circumstantial characteristics. Recognizing the existence and potential power of a need 
for meaning-in-life does not require abandoning other theories of terrorism and 
radicalization. The existential drive may not be a primary or even secondary motivation 
for some, yet it likely exists at varying levels for all. Like other causes, it exists on a 
spectrum. In this sense, the extrinsic, instrumental, strategic objectives and intrinsic, 
existential rewards are a false dichotomy. However, a rebalance is needed—where the 
extrinsic and intrinsic hold equal footing. Only then can terrorism studies contend with 
the full complexity of the still unanswered question: “what causes a person to become a 
terrorist?” 
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